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Abstract 
This thesis examines and investigates the Japanese community in Shanghai from 
their emergence and formation in the city in the late nineteenth century to their 
development through the early Republic era, focusing particularly on the Japanese 
concentration in Hongkou district in the early twentieth century. 
In light of a thorough examination on the historical-geographical background of 
the city of Shanghai, the first part of this thesis reveals the uniqueness of the urban 
space and the hybrid culture of modem Shanghai and the special characteristics of the 
Hongkou district. This part not only introduces the milieu within which the Japanese 
community initiated and developed, but also shows the complexity of the foreign 
presence in the city. 
The second part of the thesis is a discussion on the formation, structure and 
actions of the Japanese community in Shanghai. Without an exclusive Japanese 
concession, the Japanese community in Shanghai developed by joining the foreign 
enclaves in the city - the International Settlement in Shanghai. However, they had 
established their own “sphere of influence，，in Hongkou district through their 
consulate and other Japanese communal organizations, and fostered their own 
lifestyle in Hongkou. 
By focusing on the relationship between the Japanese community and other 
foreign or Chinese communities in Shanghai, the last part of this thesis relates the 
Sino-Japanese tension to Japanese communal lives in Shanghai. Inside the authority 
of the International Settlement, they had less voice than their western counterparts. 
Meanwhile, the anti-Japanese sentiment in China and organized actions against Japan 
in Shanghai irritated the Japanese community, who reached its exploding point in 
1932. The Japanese military actions in the January of 1932 may partly result from the 
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The Japanese empire in modem China, which initiated from the end of 
nineteenth century, can be distinguished two forms: the formal and informal ones, 
demonstrating two different kinds of Japanese experience and roles in China] While 
in its formal colonies, the Japanese had enjoyed the overall control of the local society 
and was able to promote their colonial policies in a planned way, it was impossible for 
other Japanese societies to establish such authorities in many Chinese treaty ports, 
where also held a large number of Japanese migrants in some insulated Japanese 
communities. 
Among all the Japanese communities in different Chinese treaty ports, the 
Japanese community in Shanghai might be the most unusual one, not only because the 
Japanese failed to establish their exclusive concession in this city but also because of 
the complexity of the foreign presence in this “queen of the treaty ports in China，，. 
Current scholarship in the history of Shanghai centers upon the multiplicity of the city, 
among which there is a growing body of writings on the complexity of the "foreign 
presence" in Shanghai.^ However, little attention has been given to the Japanese 
community. 
The modem relationship between Japan and Shanghai can be traced back to 
1862，when the Senzaimaru (千歲九)，the first Japanese vessel of the modem era, 
arrived in Shanghai. Ten years later, by the time that modem Japan first opened 
diplomatic and trade relations with China in 1871, the Japanese Consulate was first 
established in Shanghai on the north bank of the Suzhou Creek (蘇州河).And during 
the early twentieth century, the Japanese community in Shanghai became the largest 
foreign community in the city. 
This study focuses on the Japanese community in Shanghai: their emergence 
and development in the city from the late nineteenth century in general, and their 
concentration in Hongkou (虹口） in the early twentieth century in particular. This 
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study investigates how these “latecomers，’ established their own kingdom in the 
foreign enclave; how deep their self-governing institutions influenced the daily life of 
the ordinary Japanese in Hongkou district; and how these administrative agents and 
other organizations had given these Shanghai Japanese a sense of identity and 
cohesiveness in the city even without a formal Japanese concession. It also gave rise 
to a vision of the ordinary Japanese life in the "margin space” between the Chinese 
and non-Chinese communities, how they earned their livings, fostered a unique 
lifestyle and cultivated the social responsibility towards their community in Shanghai. 
Three scholars — Mark R. Peattie, Christian Henriot, and Joshua A. Fogel — 
have contributed to our understanding of the Japanese experience in Chinese treaty 
ports. Peattie carefully researches the general living conditions of the Japanese in 
Chinese treaty ports and points out some large-size Japanese communities in China 
and their demand for strong action constrained Japanese foreign policy.^ Henriot has 
paid special attention to the importance of the Japanese community in Shanghai by 
presenting its history through detailed statistics and careful surveys from the 1870s 
through the 1940s.4 Fogel's study of the Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai 
(JRA) focuses on the evolution of the communal organization of the Japanese 
community in Shanghai.^ Besides Peattie, Henriot and Fogel, some Japanese and 
Chinese scholars, such as Takatsuna Hirofumi, Chen Zu'en and Ma Changlin have 
also written on various aspects of the Japanese community in Shanghai.^ 
However, much of the existing scholarship in English on Japan's presence in 
Shanghai stresses the uniform pattern of Japanese experience in Chinese treaty ports, 
especially on the development of communal organizations and military activities. 
Little has been done on the social life of the Japanese, and the image of the Japanese 
community in Shanghai remains one-dimensional in these studies. On the other side, 
the studies by Chinese scholars focus a lot on Japan's expansionism and militarism, 
and tend to connect Japanese experience in Shanghai with Japan's increasing political, 
economic, and military encroachments in China from the 1890s to the 1940s7 Even 
though there are grounds for adopting such an approach, yet in the case of Shanghai, 
especially before the 1930s, too rigidly conforming to a model of expansionism would 
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rob the field of much vitality. 
This study attempts to present some new insights on the social history of 
Japanese community in early twentieth-century Shanghai by focusing on Hongkou 
district where the Japanese in Shanghai concentrated. By remapping Hongkou, the 
study hopes to provide information related to the historic-geographic environment, the 
population structures and the complicated foreign existence of the area, how these 
affected the growth and development of the Japanese community in Shanghai, and 
how Hongkou district had been turned into the "little Japan" in Shanghai.8 
Such a study would also reveal the internal dynamics of social history of modem 
Shanghai by explicating the patterns of interaction between the Japanese community 
and those Chinese or non-Chinese communities in the city. 
This study begins by introducing the milieu within which the Japanese 
community emerged and developed. Part One - "Remapping Shanghai, Remapping 
Hongkou" - presents such fundamental information as the historic-geographic 
environment of Hongkou district, the original foreign population there before 
Japanese presence, and the early urban development at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Following this part is an analysis of the major factors behind the structuring 
of Japanese community. This section also investigates the Japanese population 
formation in the area, the policies the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai held towards 
their citizens, the communal duties of the JRA, the daily lives of the ordinary 
Japanese in Hongkou, and the social classification among them. Part three probes 
further into the relationship between the SMC (Shanghai Municipal Council) and 




REMAPPING SHANGHAI, REMAPPING HONGKOU 
THIS PART is intended to be a background study of the Japanese community in 
Shanghai during the turn of the twentieth century, including the urban development of 
modem Shanghai, the situations of the newly-arisen areas, as well as both of the 
domestic and foreign presence in different parts of the city. It has three principal 
objectives: First, it aims at offering an analysis of the historical-geographical 
background within which the foreign society in general and the Japanese community 
in particular initiated and developed. Secondly, we may acquire a preliminary yet 
necessary knowledge of the urban space of modem Shanghai which may enable us to 
better understand the uniqueness of the Japanese society and its role in the 
transformation of the city at the turn of the twentieth century. Finally, it attempts to 
make a careful study of the special characteristics of Hongkou district where the 
Japanese established their "sphere of influence” from the end of nineteenth century. 
CHAPTER ONE 
RECONFIGURATION OF THE URBAN SPACE IN MODERN 
SHANGHAI 
"Tri-cities� in Shanghai: urban space in transformation 
Shanghai is a unique case in the history of western powers' expansion in the 
East. The foreign settlements established after the conclusion of the Opium Wars 
(1839-42) combined with the original "Chinese City" (or ‘‘Native City", xiancheng 
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§系城）formed a special kind of power structure in this Chinese metropolis. Modem 
Shanghai, according to its separated realms and the different styles in governance, 
could be divided into three parts: the Chinese City, the International Settlement, and 
the French Concession. 
The "Chinese City", or the “Native City", as its name indicates, was an area 
ruled by the Chinese. Surrounded by the city walls erected during the Ming Dynasty, 
this area used to be the center of Shanghai (or Shanghai xian 上、海環系)，especially 
from the political, social and cultural perspectives.^ The surrounding regions outside 
the walled area had remained mulberry and cotton farms before 1840s. The market 
towns connected by the waterways and streams flourished during the long period of 
time when Shanghai functioned as a modest domestic trading mart and low-level 
administrative center in the Yangzi River delta. 
After the signing of the Treaty of Nanjing, the foreigners, who came to Shanghai 
from the "open sea”，carved out their living space and established their 'cities' all 
around the walled area." Between 1845 and 1849，three main treaty powers, Britain, 
France and United States separately established their settlements in the north part of 
Shanghai out of the city walls according to the Land Regulations.^^ The delimitation 
of a British settlement was first detailed in the Land Regulation of 1845: a tract of 
land to the north of the walled city along the Huangpu River (黃浦江)’ which was a 
total of 180 acres, had been set aside for British use]) M. Montigny, the first French 
Consul in Shanghai, entered into an agreement with Daotai (道台）Lin Gui (麟桂）in 
1849. The French acquired a separated area of over 200 acres of land north of the 
Chinese City and south of the British Settlement where they established a French 
Concession. Meanwhile, the Americans founded their informal “settlement” on the 
north of Suzhou Creek (which was also called Wusong River 吳、般江).In 1863，the 
Americans amalgamated their own tract of land with the British Settlement and finally 
established the International Settlement. 
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However, the original "design" of the absolute division between the Chinese and 
non-Chinese societies evaporated in the face of almost a million refugees driven into 
the settlements due to the depredations of several rebellions: the localized "Small 
Sword Society’，(Xiaodaohui 小刀會）revolt in 1853 and the Taiping rebellion from 
1850 to 1864. The huge influx of Chinese spurred the formation of the Shanghai 
Municipal Council (SMC) in the former Anglo-American settlements in 1854，which 
later became the SMC of the united International Settlement. Meanwhile, a 
separatist tendency in foreign Shanghai was developed, and the prospect of the 
consolidation of all foreign controlled areas in Shanghai under one municipal 
administration could no longer be persisted. Fearing their national interests to be 
impaired by predominant British and American powers, the French formed their own 
municipal council, conseil municipal, in 1862.'^ 
These two municipal governments were fundamentally different with each other: 
the SMC of International Settlement was composed of elected representatives of the 
qualified foreign land renters and ratepayers, and it was constitutionally responsible 
only to its electorate rather than the direct consular or diplomatic authority,'^ while its 
counterpart in the French Concession, was subject to the approval or veto of the 
French consul" 
Since many Chinese realized the foreign settlements was able to offer not only 
refuge but also economic opportunities for them, more and more Chinese began to 
establish their businesses outside the walled city in the post-Taiping era. When the 
relationship between the two sides of the city walls was getting closer, the city walls 
served no longer as the defense for the local Chinese society but rather the barrier 
prevented the development of transportation and communication. Finally, the walls 
were officially torn down in January 1912，after the collapse of the Qing dynasty, 
even though the calling for demolition of the walls, which were proposed by local 
elites and commercial leaders, can be traced back as early as to the end of the 
1Q ^^ 
nineteenth century. The ring roads, had soon replaced the original walls and moats. 
19 Since this area located to the south of foreign settlements, it was called the 
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"Southern City，，{nanshi 南市）as well. This area together with Pudong 甫東）and 
Zhabei (閘北)，another native district developed outside the walled area and the 
foreign settlements when large amount of refugees entered Shanghai during the 1850s 
and 1860s, formed the Chinese administered areas {huajie 華界）in Shanghai. 
The Chinese City, together with other Chinese administered areas, was governed 
in a traditional way, while the International Settlement became an "independent 
republic" ruled by their own “citizens” - the land renters and ratepayers - who lived 
there. I f these two parts of Shanghai can be seen as the two “poles’，in the power 
structures of this city, the administration of French Concession can be viewed as a 
kind of middle-state. The division and combination of the "tri-cities" became the 
foundation of the development of modem Shanghai and influenced the transformation 
of its urban space. 
From the 1860s onwards, Shanghai began to evolve into a major metropolitan 
city in China and even in East Asia. Along with the growth of the population and the 
trade and industrial expansion, demands for more living and working space in the city 
emerged after the 1880s. Proposals were made to transform this pre-modem county 
into a comprehensive and systematic modem city. Thus various plans, which related 
to different fields from sanitation, public health to education, were presented and put 
into practice. Remarkable innovations and drastic improvements were conducted for 
the transportation, delivery system, infrastructure, residences, shopping and 
commercial spaces, social and cultural activities. The riverside of Huangpu was 
bunded; the metalled, cleaned, and lighted roads were built; shipped goods from 
numerous godowns and jetties were traded at the stock exchange; piped pure water 
was provided in different parts of the city; westernized hospitals and schools were 
constructed; public gardens were established; and some unplanned melange of 
Chinese housing and Western housing were developed in the same time. Such 
municipal innovations had transformed the urban space of Shanghai and provided a 
center "stage" for peoples who from different countries all over the world. 
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A divided city, a hybrid society 
Opened forcibly to foreign trade and residence, Shanghai had its urban space 
developed separately in three different scopes, of which the boundaries were changed 
for several times. In addition to their territories, their administrative authorities, the 
judicial systems, and the order of the societies varied from each other, though they 
were somehow interdependent with each other. Moreover, even inside the 
self-governing foreign settlements, different districts had their own unique 
"landscape" according to the various characters of their inhabitants. Some historians 
of Shanghai just argue that Shanghai was “a mosaic city" based on its cultural 
geography.20 
The International Settlement, for example, can be further divided into several 
parts. The "central area", where the former British Settlement had been located, was 
the center of modem Shanghai from the capitalistic and commercial perspectives. The 
"west area", an large scale of territory gained in 1898 when the International 
Settlement was further expanded on the west side of the city, together with the "east 
area", an area called Yangshupu (楊樹浦)which was part of the former American 
settlement, became two emerging areas of light industry. And the "north area", or the 
"Hongkou district’，which centered around North Sichuan Road (Bei Sichuan lu 匕四 
JIf路)，was an area slightly deviated from the center of the International Settlement 
and prospered in its own sophisticated way. Since this area is the main "stage" of this 
paper, it wi l l be further discussed in details in the following chapters. 
The other two entities in the city, the French Concession and the Chinese City, 
also enjoyed their own special characteristics. While the latter was viewed as a 
traditional and increasingly anachronistic area in the city, the French Concession, a 
charming place with a pleasant mix of wide tree-lined streets and interesting European 
style masons and gardens, earned a reputation as a haven for vice and drugs. The 
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lawlessness in this area attracted not only the gangsters but also Chinese Communist 
Party and leftist writers and intellectuals. 
However, even though the residential divisions were complex and conflicting in 
modem Shanghai, the distinctive cultures of different peoples overlapped with each 
other had also constructed a society with a hybrid culture. For instance, various 
languages from different language families, together with different Chinese dialects, 
were being used in modem Shanghai, where they might be interwoven and exchanged 
with each other in the process of communication. Sometimes, people might have to 
use two or three languages in their daily lives. And it was quite common that the 
names of the avenues and streets in the foreign settlements were written in two or 
three languages. The so-called “pidgin English", a bastardized China Coast potpourri 
of mangled English, Chinese, Portuguese and Indian words, became a useful language 
tool not only for business but also for daily communications. As to the juridical 
system, different courts, including the "mixed court，，in the settlements, which was 
formed to settle legal disputes between Chinese and foreigners, the intendant's 
Yamen for the Chinese people, and other consulate courts for the foreigners, 
co-existed in the same place in the views of different groups of people. At least six 
countries had their own postal service in Shanghai, which served both the people from 
their own countries and the Chinese people in the foreign settlements. Even though 
most people shared the standard Occidental calendar system in Shanghai, other 
disparate systems of "time" were still pursued due to the divergent religions and 
customs. Various festivals and anniversaries (such as the Chinese New Year, 
Christmas, Japanese Emperor's birthday, the anniversary of the accession of the Great 
Qing Emperors, and etc.) were celebrated in this city. 
These multiple cultural levels of modem Shanghai approach acknowledges that 
this "divided" city emphasized the differences between various groups of people, yet 
at the same time their civic lives and activities were conducted, though within these 
distinct frames, for the balance of each other. This also influenced the formation of the 
Japanese community who entered Shanghai from late nineteenth century. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HOW SPECIAL WAS HONGKOU DISTRICT IN SHANGHAI? 
Where was "Hongkou"? 
In today's Shanghai map, Hongkou district (虹 口區）is located in the north-east 
of the city, bordering Yangpu district (楊浦區）on the east, Zhabei district (鬧北區）on 
the west, Pudong new area G甫東新區)and Huangpu district (黃浦區）across the 
Huangpu River and Suzhou Creek to the south, and the Baoshan district (寶山區）on 
the north.22 However, when people talk about “Hongkou，’，they refer to a narrower 
area around Wusong Road (吳液路)，Raining Road (海寧路）and North Sichuan Road 
(四川北路).Before 1947，the name “Hongkou，，(or "Hongkew" in the historical 
materials) referred to an area without specific boundary, and even after 1947，when 
Hongkou had become an administrative division in Shanghai, the border of this 
division had changed for several times. Thus, the simple question raised in this 
chapter needs more clarifications: where "Hongkou" refers to in this paper should be 
limited in the first place. 
In different Shanghai gazetteers, the word "Hongkou" can be found in several 
places, which referred, respectively, to "Hongkou Creek" {hongkou gang 虫工 口港） 
and "Hongkou Market，，{hongkou shi 虫工 口市)：the former one was a creek which 
empties itself into the Huangpu River,^^ while the latter one referred to the market 
town "five lis (里）north-east to the county’，.�* In the reign of Jiaqing (嘉慶)，Qing 
dynasty, this stream had been called “Shahong” (、?少洪)，which lied on "the east side to 
Yangshupu'\ and "connected with Wusong (River) and Huangpu (River)".^^ It is 
common, in Chinese language, that the juncture of the streams is called the “kou” 
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(mouth) of the river, thus the place where the stream empties itself into the Huangpu 
River was also known as “Hongkou” (洪口），which later became "Hongkou"(虹口） 
during the Tongzhi (同治）reign (1861-1875).^^ (See Table 1) 
Table 1 
"Hongkou" in different Gazetteers of Shanghai County 
� “ . ” ” • Year(s) of the 
Different Editions ” 丄. S e c t i o n � Contents 
compilation 
Wfln/z Reign (Ming) 1586-1588 ^^印 "S/w/ion又〃（沙洪） 
(Shanghai county) 
Kangxi Reign (Qing) 
Qianlong Reign I 
/ �� 1750 Map 
(Qmg) P "Hongkou"(虹口） 




Map (waterways) "Zhongchuanhong" 
Jiaqing Reign (Qing) 1812-1814 (中/1 丨洪),"Hongkou" 
(洪口） 
2 4 "River 
— B;anches" '(沙洪） 
"Beichuanhong"(北 
川洪)， 
Map (waterways) "Zhongchuanhong" 
(中川洪),"Hongkou" 
Tongzhi reign (Qing) 1866-1870 (虹口） 
^ ^ k e t t o w n s ; : ‘ ( 虫 f 口 — 
^ 
4 4 "River 
Branches" � (沙洪） 
Ma (Laozha area) "'^^ngkou ganf^l 
A continuation of 口港） 
, , � � 1913-1918 
the gazetteer (Qing) 4.3 "River "Hongkou (虹 
Branches" —__P^) 
Minguo (Republic) 1925-1935 2. "Waterways" g抓g"(虹 
_ _ _ J P ^ 
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14.1 "The American 
development of the Settlement in 
foreign settlements" I Hongkou district 
L i (虹口美租界） 
Source: TZSHXZ, SXXZ, MGSHZ, Wang Xiaojian (Shanghai, 1993); Zheng Zu'an (Shanghai, 
1999); Xue Liyong (Shanghai, 1994). 
From all these records, we may outline a sequence of the changing meaning of 
the name “Hongkou，，in different periods of times. “Hongkou，’ was a name referred to 
the river mouth of a creek, called “Shahong”, where it empties itself into the Huangpu 
River. Later this creek was also known as “Hongkougang” (Hongkou creek) in the 
Gazetteers, and divided into different sections according to the different positions, 
which named respectively, “beichuanhong” (北川洪)，“zhongchuanhong” (中川洪） 
and “hongkou” (虹口），from north to south. "Hongkou" was also the name for a 
market, which appeared near the south section of the Hongkou creek during the 
Daoguang (道光）reign (1821-1850). Thus, the areas around the south section of the 
Hongkou creek and the market were firstly regarded as “Hongkou”. Before the 
opening of Shanghai as a treaty port, Hongkou district consisted mainly of farmland 
and fishing villages, with the exception of the market towns of Jiangwan (、江灣)， 
Hong(虹）and Hongkou(虹口). ^ ^ Qiujiang (虫L江，or Jiujiang,舊江 “the old river", 
which is the old river route of the Suzhou Creek) marked the boundary of the district, 
south of which was Shanghai County and north of which was Baoshan County (寶山 
縣 ) .Th is should be the only possible boundary for Hongkou district before the 
foreigners came. However, "Hongkou" had still remained an area with uncertain 
limitations until the day when some Americans, most of whom were missionaries, 
passed over the Suzhou Creek and established their “informal” American settlement 
on the opposite shore to the British one. 
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American Settlement: "the Cinderella among the settlements" 
Seeking cheaper accommodation, the American Episcopal Church Mission, 
under Bishop William J. Boone, came in 1848 to the Hongkou district, across the 
Suzhou Creek. They purchased land for residences and established their church and a 
hospital which stood close by the northern bank of the Huangpu River. The tower of 
the church was a landmark for many years to the captains of ships coming up the river 
from Wusong to Shanghai, for it was the only "high point" in that area for a long time. 
At the time, the north bank of Suzhou creek was low and swampy with only a small 
population. This section of land, lying North of Suzhou Creek and including the 
district around, was called as “Hongkew” or ‘‘Hongque” by these foreigners. 
The founding of the American Settlement seemed to be a natural, not a political 
growth, caused by an expansion or overflow from the old British Settlement. Some 
historians argued that ‘‘the American Settlement was not created, but 'just growed'" in 
Shanghai.28 However, even though the Shanghai Daotai acquiesced when Bishop 
Boone established an American community in Hongkou (and there had been an 
official American consulate flying the Stars and Stripes at Hongkou since 1854), the 
boundaries of the American Settlement had not been clarified until 1863 when the 
American Settlement merged itself with the British Settlement. Thus, it is difficult to 
give an exact or definite account of the formation of its original area. In 1863，the 
boundary of American settlement was settled after several negotiations between 
Shanghai Daotai and the American consul, George R Seward. In that regulation, the 
name “Hongkou” had been officially equated with the American Settlement for the 
first time,29 even though the settlement included a large tract of land of Yangshupu. 
This kind of equation may result from the fact that this settlement had been initiated 
in the Hongkou district since the time of Bishop Boone. Furthermore, Hongkou was 
the center of the American Settlement, and on its right opposite bank of the Huangpu 
River, laid the "Bund", which was the central part of the foreign society in Shanghai. 
Nevertheless, this settlement was much under-developed and was justly called 
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as “the Cinderella among the settlements", since there was only some small taxable 
resources to provide for the maintenance of order.^^ And the urban infrastructure 
construction in this area had swiftly developed after the amalgamation in 1863. The 
land in Hongkou was surveyed, the gambles and brothels in this district were 
registered, and new municipal infrastructure was developed in this part of the city. 
From waterways to waterfronts 
As discussed before, Hongkou district was an area combined with several 
waterways, including Hongkou Creek, Qiu Creek inside the district, and Suzhou 
Creek, Huangpu River marked as boundaries. Even though both of Hongkou Creek 
and the Qiu Creek were two main waterways in the district connecting the 
surrounding market towns during the pre-modem time and have kept in use even until 
resent time, their status as the main water routes of the local trading system declined 
during the modem time. Suzhou Creek, which was called Wusong River by the 
Chinese, linking Shanghai with Suzhou (蘇州）and other Jiangnan (江南）market 
towns, used to be the most important river for shipping in Jiangnan area, yet in 
modem time, its transport status had been replaced by the Huangpu River, which 
became the “artery” of modem Shanghai because of the huge profits carried by 
increased maritime trade. Even the high-ranking officials of Qing government realized 
its significance for the city: 
"Huangpu River, which comes from Huating (華亭）and surrounds the (Shanghai) 
county from south, east and north, converges with the Wusong River, and then 
entered the sea in Baoshan. The width of (Huangpu River) is from one to three lis 
(里)，and depth is from five to six zhangs (丈）.There is no hill outside to hinder 
(the river mouth), and no reef and shoal inside to block (the river route). All the 
huge ships from Denglai,(登萊，Yantai 煙臺 in present day). Canton and Fukien, 
can hoist the sails and run at fast speed. Both of the (foreign) steamships and the 
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(Chinese) junks can easily run through (the Huangpu River).�3i 
Some historians argue that this was an important change in nineteenth century 
Shanghai, which “took place on the waterfront instead of the waterways".^^ However, 
as to the shift from the waterways to waterfronts, most people would like to focus a 
lot on the remarkable story of “the Bund", yet little was written on the opposite shore 
of the Huangpu River, where the Suzhou Creek empties itself into the river at 
Hongkou. 
When the foreigners arrived, “the Bund" was originally a towing path with a 
wide foreshore, covered or uncovered according to the state of the tide and its wide 
open space was secured, not from any aesthetic sense, but because of the necessity of 
leaving a path for the trackers. From time immemorial, trackers had used the tow path 
along the shore of the Huangpu River and the Chinese authorities in the first Land 
Regulations issued by them reserved this right. A space of 30 English feet was to be 
reserved between buildings erected on the foreshore and the edge of the river. 
Foreigners, therefore, when putting up their buildings on river lots, drove in piles to 
that distance in front of each lot, and filled it in. This regulation had been observed, 
and this section of waterfront became the symbol of the foreign societies in Shanghai 
not because of the wharves or piers, but rather because of the well-established 
merchant buildings along the riverbank. 
Meanwhile most steamship wharves and piers were constructed on the Hongkou 
waterfronts instead of the opposite bank of the Huangpu River. Many waterfront 
properties in Hongkou, from wharves, piers to machine shops and company buildings, 
were established, first, by some American-owned steamship navigation companies. 
Later, navigation companies from other countries, including Britain, Germany and 
even China, entered the rivalry of this section of the waterfront.^^ 
Besides these western powers, Japan also wanted to share the profits of the 
overseas shipping and trading in Shanghai, even though they were late comers to this 
Chinese largest treaty port. The steamship line between Yokohama and Shanghai, 
which was started by Mitsubishi in 1875 and taken over by its successor, the Nihon 
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Yasen Kaisha (曰本郵船會社，N.Y.K., Japan Mail Steamship Co.), in 1885, was 
Japan's first overseas shipping line. After that, other Japanese shipping companies, 
including the Osaka Shosen Kaisha (大阪商船會社，O.S.K.，Osaka Commercial 
Shipping Company) and Nisshin Kisen (日清汽船，Japan-China Steamship 
Company), had developed their China business from the end of twentieth century.；々 
These companies, like their western competitors, constructed wharves along the 
Huangpu River, and most of them were located in Hongkou, Yangshupu and Pudong. 
Thus, to some extent, the arrival of the American shipping companies, together 
with some other companies from different countries, changed the main image of 
Hongkou. When the Hongkou waterfront developed rapidly after 1860s, the north part 
of Hongkou, with its adjacent waterfront also called as "Outer Hongkou" 
{waihongkou 夕虫工口)，had become the center of the district at the end of nineteenth 
century. 
Bridges and Roads 
The municipal construction in Hongkou district had remained underdeveloped 
before the amalgamation of the British and American Settlements in 1863. However, 
bridges were erected on the Huangpu River and Suzhou Creek even before the urban 
development in Hongkou speeded up at the turn of twentieth century in order to 
connect the British and the American Settlement. At first, the only way of crossing the 
Suzhou Creek was by ferry, and of course it was inconvenient, especially in the 
inclement weather.^^ The need of a bridge was apparent, and in the first instance it 
was supplied by a man named Wills who organized the “Soochow (Suzhou) Creek 
Bridge Company". A bridge known as "Wills Bridge", a wooden structure, was 
erected in 1856 at a cost of $12,000. The company made a great profit from the tolls 
collected from those using the bridge. ^^  In one of the contemporary notes (biji,筆言己） 
the story of the bridge was recorded: 
16 
"The currents (of Suzhou Creek) are rushing and the creek is wide. There used to 
be some ferry boats run on the river, which would be closed in the evenings. 
Hence, there were no transportation connected the south and north side of the 
creek at nights. After the city was opened to the foreign trade and commerce, the 
westerners made a wooden bridge on it, which is of 180 paces in length. There is 
a tenon in the centre which is circled by a shackle. (This forms a drawbridge in 
the centre that) could open for the passage of the boats/'^^ 
Some years later, a free bridge, known as the Garden Bridge, was erected by the 
Municipal Council. From then on, more bridges were erected on the Suzhou Creek 
and this wooden bridge was replaced by a metal-structured bridge in 1906. 
Besides these bridges across the Suzhou Creek, three main bridges had been 
erected by the Municipal Council on Hongkou Creek in the The bridges 
were called, from south to north, as "Outer Hong Bridge’，{waihongqiao,外虫工橋)’ 
"Middle Hong Bridge" {zhonghongqiao 中虹橋） a n d “Inner Hong Bridge" 
{lihongqiao 裏虹橋 ) . B y these three bridges, the Hongkou district had been divided 
into three parts, which were called, respectively, as "Outer Hongkou" {waihongkou 
外 虹 口 )，"Middle Hongkou” {zhonghongkou 中虹口 )，and "Inner Hongkou" 
{lihongkou 裏虫工口）. When new bridge was built on the Fearon Road (which now 
called 九育I路 Jiulong Road) across the Hongkou Creek in the late 1880s, it was 
named “New Hong Bridge，，{xinhongqiao 新虫工橋).And the area developed on the 
both sides of this new bridge was naturally called as "New Hongkou" {xinhongkou 新 
虫工口）. The connection of the different parts of Hongkou district was strengthened by 
these bridges. ^^  
As to the roads (maloo ,馬路）built by the SMC of the International Settlement, 
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we can trace the following evolution: First, the land renter made his own road and 
handed it over to the Municipal Council to keep up; second, the land owner bought 
the land for the road and the Council made it up; and thirdly, the Council bought the 
land and made the road. For Hongkou district, there were only two well-built roads in 
this district, Wusong Road and Broadway Road when the American Settlement 
merged itself with the British in 1863. Both of the two roads were built by the 
individual land renters. Gradually the roads system underwent an extension, an 
extension from the central part of the former British Settlement to the west part, from 
the south bank of Suzhou Creek to the north bank. However, the development of 
district's business concentrated in the area near the Hongkou Bund before twentieth 
century. Except from some signs of lives in the markets around the Broadway Road, 
the district was still mixed up by hamlets and wastelands during the late nineteenth 
century. When Hongkou became part of the International Settlement, its municipal 
construction was incorporated into the plan of the SMC. The minute of Shanghai 
Municipal Council shows that “the roads in Hongkew (Hongkou) were reported to be 
in bad state" in 1864，but ‘‘new lines of roads were being marked out." Hence, new 
paths and roads were opened up or under construction, and the Bund (the Hongkou 
Bund) prospered shortly after the amalgamation.'^' 
At the turn of twentieth century, accompanied with the expansion of the 
International Settlement, Hongkou district was "enlarged" and extended to the areas 
north to the Boundary Road by the construction of North Sichuan Road and Dixwell 
Road. These so-called “external roads areas" or "extra-settlement roads areas" used to 
be under the control of Baoshan County, and then became the 
"semi-foreign-settlement" (banzujie 半 租 界 ) i n Shanghai. By building roads, 
International Settlement, whose boundaries had been settled since 1899, nevertheless 
tried to extend westward and northward. It controlled the distribution of water and 
electricity in these sectors, ensured law and order, and in return, collected taxes from 
inhabitants. The area of International Settlement was thus doubled by this de facto 
annexation. 42 Thus, the subdivisions in Hongkou district were shaped by the 
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construction of the road network. This enlarged Hongkou district connected 
Yangshupu on the east, and Zhabei on the west, located on the heart place of a 
non-westem foreigners' society, the Japanese society. These "extra-settlement roads’， 
together with the former discussed roads which occupied the central part of the 
Hongkou district, formed the main stage for the Japanese community, who let 
Hongkou become a "Little Tokyo" in the early twentieth century Shanghai. 
New frontiers for new comers 
Shanghai's migrants hailed predominantly from the Canton region in the period 
immediately following the Opium War, and Hongkou district was one of the centers 
for the Cantonese. The so-called “Guangdong bang"(廣東幫）or “Yuebang"(粤幫） 
in Shanghai, who had close relationship with the Shanghai Daotai of the pre-Taiping 
era，Wu Jianzhang (吳健章力，lived mainly in three parts of the city. A group of 
these Cantonese which "comprised mainly lower-class workers, vagabonds, and the 
unemployed，’44 chose to live in Hongkou district. We have no record of the exact 
number of Cantonese living in Hongkou, however, it is recorded that, at the beginning 
of 1865，after the great exodus of refugees returning to their homes, there were still 
20,000 Chinese living in Hongkou district."^^ The regions on the both sides of Qiu 
River, where was the boundary area between Shanghai County and Baoshan County, 
had became a "vacuum area" and had higher crime rate than any other areas in the 
city. 46 There were skirmishers, gangsters, vagabonds, together with the foreign 
adventurers, American sailors, and remnant soldiers from “Ever-Victorious Army"'^^ 
living among the district's local residents.48 But there were only six policemen for the 
control of the large population. Besides the problem of the lack of the police force, the 
effectiveness of the police control in the wealthy English settlement had also "flooded 
Hongkou with disorderly characters"/^ Hongkou, to some extend, was the haven for 
these new comers, no matter from other parts of China or from foreign countries. 
Among all the “sins” in the district, the most impressive story was the rapid growth of 
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prostitution in Hongkou. As described by Gail Hershatter: 
"North Sichuan Road, in the Hongkou district north of the International 
Settlement, became a center for Cantonese, Japanese, Korean, and (after the 
October Revolution) White Russian brothels, side by side with the dance halls, 
movie houses, teahouses, restaurants, bathhouses, beauty shops, and massage 
parlors where many casual prostitutes worked. 
At the time, a small but growing Japanese community, constituted by small 
businessmen, settled mostly in the yet-undeveloped Hongkou district?】 During the 
early Meij i years (1868-1912), the Japanese women in Shanghai 'Vorked largely in 
the flesh trade".^^ Some of them served as the concubines to foreigners, while others 
“doubled as maidservants, teahouse waitresses, and small-restaurant owners". ^^  
Among all these "services", Japanese teahouse, which was known as “Dongyang 
Chashe” (東洋茶市土)，was one of the most attractive places for the local Chinese, not 
only because of the exotic charm of the Japanese females, but also the low price in 
these teahouses. ^^  However, in early 1880s，many Japanese prostitutes were 
repatriated by the Japanese consul-general in Shanghai because the Japanese 
government thought they had damaged the "international reputation’，of Japan.^^ 
Hongkou district held nearly a quarter o f Japanese population in Shanghai 
during the early twentieth century, and most of which were the small traders, 
freelancers and some other people from lower classes. Even though the Hongkou 
district lay apart from other non-Chinese spheres in Shanghai, it still was part of the 
International Settlement and the Japanese had had to deal constantly with the western 
existence than some other Japanese settlements in Shanghai, like those living in 
Yangshupu and Zhabei. 
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PART TWO 
STRUCTURING OF THE JAPANESE COMMUNITY 
IN HONGKOU DISTRICT 
THE TREATY OF Shimonoseki marks a clear shift of Sino-Japanese relation in 
modem times and in the development of the Japanese community in Shanghai. The 
following part examines the formation, structure, and action of the Japanese residents 
in the city in the post-war era. This part is divided into three broad sections: the first 
section scrutinizes the development of the Japanese community in Shanghai after the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki. The second section focuses on the organizations inside the 
Japanese community in the city, based on which the Japanese community formed and 
administrated. And the last section portrays the groupings of their community in 
Shanghai and the image of their daily lives in Hongkou district where the majority of 
the Japanese were concentrated. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE LATECOMERS TO SHANGHAI 
Why not an exclusive Japanese Concession? 
To end the first Sino-Japanese War, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on 
Apri l 17, 1895，after the difficult negotiations between Ito Hirobumi (伊藤博文）and 
L i Hongzhang (李鴻章).Harsh terms were imposed on China, which provided for the 
end of Chinese suzerainty over Korea, giving Korea independence, and for the cession 
to Japan of Taiwan, the Pescadores islands {Penghu Qundao 膨湖群島)，Port Arthur 
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{Lushun 方©瞑)and the Liaodong (遼東)peninsula. Japan also imposed a large 
indemnity and forced China to open five new treaty ports. Japan officially gained 
most-favored-nation status, which made the same privileges of extraterritoriality in 
Chinese treaty ports (not only the five new treaty ports opened under the Article Six 
of the Shimonoseki Treaty, but also all those treaty ports opened by the West) 
available to this Chinese "small, hitherto insignificant, n e i g h b o r ” . 
An extra “Treaty of Commerce and Navigation" was signed on July 21, 1896 to 
regulate the Japanese trade in China, in which some concrete applications in the 
establishment of the Japanese concessions in Chinese treaty ports were clarified. The 
treaty acknowledged that Japan would enjoy the consular jurisdiction in China, agreed 
the setting-up of Japanese consulates in the opened treaty ports. A l l the Japanese 
citizens who chose to live in these cities would enjoy the freedom of traveling, 
engaging in trade and commerce, and setting up factories in these Chinese treaty-port 
cities. Moreover, in these cities, the Japanese people could rent lands to build houses, 
establish schools, hospitals or churches, as well as locate their cemeteries.^^ Later in 
the same year, another special clause, which was called as "Gongli Wenping"(公立文 
憑）in Chinese, was signed by the Chinese and Japanese government in order to 
permit Japan to set up Japanese concessions in Shanghai, Tianjin (天津)，Xiamen (廈 
門）and Hankou (漢口).58 At the time, Shanghai, of course, was one of the earliest 
and most important treaty ports in China, where the Japanese society had already 
initiated and developed for more than twenty years. The Japanese concessions were 
immediately established in the latter three cities from 1898 to 1899. In Shanghai, 
however, it remained an “informal，，settlement and failed to become a concession. 
This was "something of an anomaly", as Mark R. Peattie argued, "while the city 
was the earliest and most important focus for the interplay of Japanese power, capital, 
and settlement in China, these elements did not operate within an exclusive Japanese 
concession” .59 Why the Japanese did not establish their exclusive concession in 
Shanghai after all these treaties and agreements were signed with the Chinese 
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government? Why did the Japanese fail to do the same thing that they had already 
accomplished in most of the Chinese treaty ports? Why did they finally decide to join 
the foreign enclaves in the city instead of establishing their own "territory"? 
In fact, the main dispute was the location of the Japanese concession in 
Shanghai. Since 1896，the Japanese Consul in Shanghai had negotiated this problem 
with Shanghai Daotai for several times, but they did not reach any agreement. Lii 
Haihuan (呂海寰)，the Shanghai Daotai, suggested, after careful investigation, that 
Yangshupu district, which laid on the east side of Hongkou along the Huangpu River, 
might be a suitable spot for Japanese Concession. Yangshupu, thanks to its particular 
geographical position, was a developing industrial area with great potential for 
shipping and business. But Lii，s suggestion was rejected by the Japanese, 
During the time, both foreign authorities in Shanghai, the International 
Settlement and the French Concession, were seeking for the opportunity of the further 
expansion of their realms. Yangshupu district was obviously the further ambition and 
goal o f the SMC of International Settlement.^^ Even though before 1899 there was no 
sign of compromise from Chinese govemment,^^ most of the industrial and trading 
firms in Yangshupu district had been already controlled by western merchants. 
Japanese diplomats must have realized that i f they accepted Yangshupu as their sphere 
in the city, this would result in conflicts between the Japanese and those western 
Shanghailanders, and their relationship with Britain might be impaired. It is not 
groundless to suspect that the motive of Shanghai Daotai was to arouse the frictions 
between these two members of foreign powers in Shanghai, from which the Chinese 
government might get some benefit.^^ Even Liu Kunyi (蕃p申一)，the Minister of 
Nanyang {Nanyang dachen,南洋大臣)，admitted that they might not be able to 
prevent such foreign expansion in Shanghai.64 
In 1898, Wusong ( 吳 肌 a small port located at the mouth of the Yangzi River 
which is about thirty kilometers northeast of Shanghai, was opened for business by 
Qing government. The Japanese Plenipotentiary in China, Yano Fumi (矢野文雄)， 
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soon proposed to establish a Japanese Concession in Wusong instead of in Shanghai, 
since the location of the Japanese Concession in Shanghai had not been settled. 
However, neither Liu Kunyi nor Cai Jun (蔡鈴)，the Shanghai Daotai, could accept 
this proposal, because there was no foreign concession or settlement in Wusong and 
they believed that i f Japan started to set up their concession there, other foreign 
powers would do the same thing and this would bring malpractice for those 
self-opening ports.^^ Chinese government was quite unyielding and insisted that all 
the foreign settlements could not be expanded towards Baoshan County, within which 
Wusong was located/^ 
When the western powers finally succeeded in the land expansion, Yangshupu 
district was finally included into the International Settlement on May 8, 1899. After 
that, Japan had not pressed for a Japanese Concession in Shanghai any more, even 
when it became an important member of the commercial and trading competition in 
Shanghai. 
Mark R. Peattie has asserted that Japan finally decided not to press its claims to 
an excluded concession in Shanghai because: 
"The Japanese recognized that it would be more advantageous to operate within 
the boundaries of the already flourishing International Settlement than to 
attempt to secure some area outside it, which would inevitably be less 
conveniently located—much less developed 
Besides this plausible explanation, there might be some other reasons why Japan 
finally gave up the idea: First, as a newcomer and latecomer to Shanghai, their 
position was ambiguous at the time. It was difficult for Japan to suggest any spots in 
Shanghai, where were not under the control of foreign power or beyond their sphere 
of influence. While the central part of the city had already been carved up by the 
westerners, even in those outskirts, such as Yangshupu and Pudong, there also existed 
many west-owned shipping yards, factories, as well as the navigation companies 
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which occupied the areas along the Huangpu River. Second, based on the land 
regulations, Japanese people, like any nationals of other full-fledged treaty powers, 
could buy or rent land freely in the boundaries of International Settlement (and even 
outside) and they had also enjoyed the same privileges which those western people 
had out of the most-favored-nation status they gained after the Shimonoseki Treaty. 
Lastly, most of their civilians in Shanghai had already concentrated in a small area, 
Hongkou district, where situated on the north bank of the Huangpu. Based on a name 
list recorded in 1894，we find that nearly sixty percent of the Japanese who stayed in 
Shanghai during the Sino-Japanese conflict had been living in Hongkou.^^ Because a 
large group of people of the Japanese community in Shanghai had been engaged in 
the foreign part of the city, especially in Hongkou district, it was impossible and 
unwise to demand them to leave their base and move to any other parts, especially 
those underdeveloped areas, in the city. 
Population growth after 1895 
There had been a long pre-modem history of ties between Shanghai and Japan, 
going back to as early as the fifteenth century. Besides some unpleasant “contacts” 
with those Japanese pirates during the Ming dynasty, the commercial relations had 
developed under some kind of monopoly policy for a long time.^^ The first Japanese 
vessel of modem era, the Senzaimaru, visited Shanghai in 1862 during the late 
Shogunate period in order to look for possible future commercial ties with this 
China's busiest treaty po r t .Howeve r , during the bakumatsu (幕末）period 
(1860-1868)，Shanghai had provided Japanese with its special "western" experience, 
rather than the commercial opportunities/' 
During the early Meiji years (1868-1894)，the population of the Japanese in 
Shanghai grew slowly. According to the statistics of SMC, there were only seven 
Japanese who had settled in the former English and “Hongkou，，settlement in 1870’ 
while there were another twenty-two Japanese sailors. Even in some other materials 
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recorded by the contemporary Japanese diplomats and other visitors, the Japanese 
population in Shanghai had not surpassed sixty in the early 1870s7^ During the 
1868-1880 period, especially after 1871，there was a slow yet stable increase with 
yearly increases of five or six persons. However, the gender imbalance between the 
ratios of male and female was severe: women constituted roughly two-thirds of the 
local Japanese (nearly sixty to seventy percent of them served as the concubines to 
foreigners or casual prostitutes, see Chapter Two), while only one-third of the 
Japanese population were men, most of whom were engaged in the small businesses. 
Only a small proportion served as the staffs in Japanese Kaisha or worked for the 
consulate services. Before the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-95)，the Japanese 
population reached 639，with men first time outnumbering women (337 men, 302 
women, see Table However, such growth tendency had been interrupted by the 
outbreak of the war in 1894.74 
On the eve of the conflict of 1894-95，the great majority of Japanese 
withdrew.75 As Uchiyama Kiyoshi (内山清）recorded in his Dai Shanhai (Greater 
Shanghai,大上海)： 
"At the time (of the first Sino-Japanese war), nearly all of the one thousand 
resident Japanese withdrew (from Shanghai). When those who remained 
celebrated that year's Tencho Setsu (天長節，the festival honoring the birthday of 
Japanese Emperor) on the second floor of the Konbu Kaisha (昆布會社)，which 
located on the Yangkingpang, only some thirty people came. At that time, the 
hostility (towards Japanese) among the Chinese was not like it is today (1915): 
besides only one or two persecutions and conflicts, the daily life (in Shanghai) 
were still quite peaceful. Those who lived in the foreign settlements could still 
communicate with each other. 
Those who remained in Shanghai chose to "l ive in the foreign settlements", 
because those areas were an internationally guaranteed neutral zone in Shanghai. 
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Nevertheless, the local official, Shanghai Daotai，with the help of the American 
Consulate, issued “passports，，to those so-called "law-abiding Japanese in China" 
{Anfen yu hua Riren’ 安分寓華曰人 ) . S u c h information as names, addresses, 
professions, the original hometowns in Japan, and even the appearance was recorded 
carefully, but this could only be the revenge for the similar actions earlier conducted 
by the Japanese government towards the Chinese civilians in Japan/? However, those 
Japanese who held such “passport" still could not enter the "Chinese City" or the 
outskirts of the Shanghai County.^^ 
After the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Japanese gained the position 
as a member of the club of treaty powers in China, which provided them with more 
commercial opportunities than ever before. Thus, the resident Japanese population 
increased rapidly and continuously from the beginning of the twentieth century, when 
they began to be deeply involved in the Chinese economy. (See Table 2) 
Table 2 
The Japanese Population in Shanghai, 1889-1909 
Year Male Female Total Year Male Female Total 
1889 337 302 639 1900 737 435 1,172 
1890 414 320 734 1901 935 538 1,473 
1891 435 316 751 1902 1,207 684 1,891 
1892 519 377 896 1903 1,427 789 2,216 
1893 477 389 866 1904 1,961 1,077 3,038 
1895 386 230 606 1905 2,739 1,592 4,331 
1896 488 285 773 1906 3,753 2,045 5,798 
1897 492 331 823 1907 3,912 2,300 6,212 
1898 593 339 932 1908 4,441 2,828 7,269 
1899 698 390 1,088 1909 4,971 3,085 8,029 
Sources: Nihon teikoku tokei nenkan, (The statistic yearbook of Japanese empire, 
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Hereafter NTTN, Tokyo, 1890-1910), Vol. 9-29. 
Table 2 gives a crude picture of the evolution of the Japanese population in Shanghai 
during the late Meiji era. It shows that, during the 1904-1906 period, there was a real 
leap forward, with yearly increases close to twenty-five percent. We have no concrete 
explanation for such "leap forward"; however, the Japanese ultimate victory in 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), which provided Japan with boosted self-confidence 
and the basis for further expansion in China, might work as a possible incentive to 
would-be emigrants from Japan.^ ^ During the following three years from 1907 to 1909， 
the yearly increase was also higher than ten percent, although throughout the Taisho era 
(1912-1926) the speed of such increase slowed down. (See Table 3) 
Table 3 
The Development of Japanese Population in Shanghai, 1912-1931 
Source: Nihon teikoku tokei nenkan. Vol. 32-46; Christian Henriot, "'Little 
Japan' in Shanghai: an insulated community, 1875-1945", New Frontiers: 
Imperialism 's New Communities in East Asia, 1842-1953 (Manchester, 2000), 
p. 148，Table 9.1. 
In the early Taisho era, the Japanese population in Shanghai surpassed ten 
thousand for the first time and became the largest component of the foreign population. 
By the mid-1910s they outnumbered the British by one and a half to one. In 1920 they 
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overshadowed all the foreign communities taken together.8。Even though the scale of 
the Japanese community kept increasing during the decade after World War I，there 
were relative falling-offs in some certain years, such as 1915 and 1920. It is difficult to 
trace the reason that caused such falling-offs, since we lack documentation about the 
movement of Japanese population in Shanghai and in most Chinese treaty ports. During 
1927-1931，the population of Japanese community fluctuated. It shifted back and forth, 
sometimes with a sharp increase in a single year and then a little draw-back in the 
following. The population increased sharply in 1927 (increased twenty-five percent in a 
year), then the figure fell off in 1930-1931 period, as indicated by Table 
As Mark R. Peattie argued, Japanese immigration into China was "insignificant" 
in the early years of Meiji, even though after the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 
1871 "the Japanese resident population expanded along with Sino-Japanese trade". ^^  
The real watershed was the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Boxer 
Protocal signed after the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, which "set off a small 
spurt of Japanese immigration into China". Other Japanese significant triumphs in early 
twentieth century also caused the growth of the Japanese population in China，The 
growth of Japanese population in Shanghai was very similar to the situation of the 
whole country, since Shanghai was the commercial center and the largest treaty port at 
the time. 
In the early twentieth century, besides Manchuria, Shanghai had become the 
largest center of Japanese economic activities and attracted the largest amount of 
Japanese investment in China.岔斗 As part of the expansion, the Japanese community in 
this city developed along with the establishment of their web of trading, shipping, 
banking, industry, and retail interests. Also, by the 1920s, the population growth of the 
Japanese community in Shanghai had been influenced by the amounting anti-Japanese 
agitation from adjacent and hostile Chinese populations. From the statistics, we can see 
the decrease of the population resulted from the Chinese pressure and successive waves 
of Chinese nationalism. 
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Choose Shanghai, Choose Hongkou 
''Why go to Shanghai?" 
Going to Shanghai meant different things to different Japanese people. From those 
recorded motivations, we learn a lot about why Shanghai attracted those Japanese 
reformers, travelers, and even some famous novelists,^^ such as Tanizaki Jun'ichiro (谷 
崎、潤一郎)，Akutagawa Ryunosuke (芥川龍之介)，who went to Shanghai just for 
adventure.86 Another Japanese reformer, Miyazaki Toten (宮崎、滔天)，dreamt of going 
to the mainland China, and he even shed tears of joy when he arrived in Shanghai in 
1891.87 Meanwhile，those diplomatic officers and other branch managers of the main 
Japanese enterprises were simply sent by their official superior and the boss. However, 
why other ordinary Japanese folks went to Shanghai is a question very difficult to 
answer. 
Unlike those people who had sojourned in the city or just had a short visit, most of 
poorer people lived longer in the city. However, conceptually, going to Shanghai was no 
great move. After China, and later Russia, was defeated by Japan, China was regarded 
as a backward Asian country by the Japanese people. Uchiyama Kanzo (内山完造)， 
who is famous for his long-term friendship with Lu Xun (魯迅)’ had similar thought 
when he was introduced to work as a salesman for a Japanese pharmacy in Shanghai. 
Uchiyama was one of the typical Japanese from the grass-root level who earned his 
l iving by a low wage as a postman in Kyoto before he went to Shanghai. The biographer 
described why he finally accepted such an offer to work in Shanghai: 
"After Kanzo had heard (this suggestion), he could not help surprising (at it). He 
had once thought that all the people in the society were better than him, and he had 
always felt himself incompetent than others. So (he thought) it would be impossible 
for him to make any accomplishment if he did not go to those backward societies. 
Thus, he had once thought of going to China."88 
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Because of the lack of other materials, we cannot simply equal Uchiyama's 
motivation and thinking to those relatively poorer Japanese immigrants to Shanghai. 
But this cannot be an individual case. Throughout the early twentieth century, the 
economic situation of the grass-root Japanese had not been improved, i f not deteriorated. 
For example, the number of Japanese peasant proprietors steadily decreased so that by 
1910 it has been estimated that 45 per cent of all arable land in Japan was being fanned 
by tenants. Standards of living remained low, and the life of the Japanese peasant was a 
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hard one. Thus, to some extent, these Japanese grass-root people left Japan for 
Shanghai had some similar motivation as Uchiyama's, that is, to avoid feared or 
experienced frustrations at home. Thus, in the wider materialistic sense, most Japanese 
came to help themselves, that is, to earn a living. 
From the late Shogunate to the early Meiji period, there was only a little group of 
Japanese traders started their small businesses in Shanghai, most of who came from 
Nagasaki (長崎)，a western prefecture in Kyushu (九少卜 1) lies only 800 kilometers away 
from Shanghai. In 1868, the first Japanese firm in Shanghai, "Tashiro House"(田代屋)， 
was opened on Suzhou Road in the British Settlement as a porcelain import-export 
company. Later on, other stores dealing with art objects, printings, and lady cosmetics 
(such stores were especially welcome by those Japanese women, most of who served as 
maid in those western families in Shanghai), were opened successively around it. 
After the Meiji Restoration, when there were more Japanese traders and Meiji 
diplomatists came to Shanghai, the “Tashiro House" began to run an inn next door 
concurrently, which became a center for Japanese in Shanghai. Not only the travelers 
and traders came here to communicate with other expatriates and listen to the news from 
their homeland, but even the high ranking officers of the Japanese diplomatic corps 
chose to rest in "Tashiro House" when they were sent to negotiate with the Shanghai 
Daotai in September, 1870.^ ^ Thus, some historians just regard such period as "Tashiro 
House period”（田代屋時代).9i (See Table 4) 
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Table 4 
Japanese Firms in Shanghai, in First Decade of Meiji Era 
Newly opened Japanese Firms in Shanghai 
Meiji Year 1 (1868) Tashiro House (Porcelain, Inn) 
Araki House (Sundries, Cosmetics); 
Meiji Year 4 (1871) 
Kiwata House (Steamship wholesaler. Porcelain, Cosmetics) 
Meiji Year 5 (1872) Kiyo Company (Cosmetics, Inn) 
Meiji Year 6 (1873) Kaitsuu Company (Sea goods) 
Meiji Year 8 (1875) ^Mitsubishi (Shipping firm) 
Kougyou Company (Sea goods); 
Meiji Year 9 (1876) 
Alima Company (Porcelain, Cosmetics) 
*Mitsui (Coal business); 
Meiji Year 10 (1877) Eisho Company (Porcelain, Cosmetics); 
Ryugen Company (Porcelain, Sundries) 
* Firms still existed in 1914.+ 
Source: Shina Boueki Annai (Guidance for trade in China, 1914)，cited in Yonezawa 
Hideo, "Shanhai hojin hatten shi，，，p.l 19. 
Why these Nagasaki merchants pioneered in the development of Japanese 
communities in Shanghai? While some historians argue that it may simply because of 
the close distance between the two places, the early interactions between Shanghai 
and Nagasaki during the bakumatsu period had also influenced their later choice. 
As the only open window to the outside world before Japan was reopened to the 
foreign countries, Nagasaki had served as the only gateway for the introduction of 
goods and information from overseas. Meanwhile, after it was opened forcibly to 
foreign trade and residence, Shanghai had quickly developed into a kind of hub, not 
+ Mitsui together with NYK (Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Japanese Mail Steamship Company), the successor of 
Mitsubishi, were two of Japan's big-three service enterprises in China. See William D. Wray, "Big-Three 
Service Enterprises". 
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only linking the domestic economy with international markets, but also serving as a 
center of the information network in the region. Thus while the economic ties between 
the two places were intensified, other cultural relations were developed in the mean time. 
For example, even before the shipping routes linking two cities was started in 1859 by a 
British navigation company, large amounts of the Chinese translations of Western books 
had already been transferred from Shanghai to Nagasaki through western missionaries.^^ 
Some famous samurais, who had voyaged to Shanghai during the late Shogunate period, 
regarded the image of modem Shanghai as a "westernized modem world", which also 
deeply influenced some Nagasaki merchants. Hence, these Japanese adventurers played 
a key, and sometimes decisive, role in the early contacts. When they finally chose 
Shanghai as the new frontiers for trading and for living, they were both businessmen 
and promoters of Japanese interactions with this city. However, the era monopolized by 
Nagasaki merchants were soon ended after the first decade of Meiji years. 
"Why Choose Hongkou？〃 
After the signing of the first Sino-Japanese Treaty in 1871，the first Japanese 
Consulate in China opened in Shanghai in 1872. Japanese trading in Shanghai 
developed quickly in the 1870s-1880s: Mitsubishi had opened both mail service and a 
steamship line to Japan in 1875. Two years later, Kishida Ginko (岸田吟香）had 
established his notorious Rakuzendo (樂善堂)~ half patent-medicine shop, half army 
intelligence center - while Mitsui had begun a coal business in Shanghai. Over the next 
decade, a range of small business dealing in sundries, foodstuffs, art objects, printing, 
services (inns and restaurants in particular), dry goods, and antiques had established 
themselves in the port.94 
However, during this period, the Japanese businesses in Shanghai were no longer 
monopolized by the Nagasaki merchants, other businessmen from Tokyo (東京)，Osaka 
(大阪)，Hokkaido (北海道)，joined the Shanghai market and took part in the Japanese 
community in the late nineteenth century. As to those Osaka merchants, for example, 
even though their presence in Shanghai was much later than their Nagasaki competitors, 
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they started to dominate in the sundries business and Japanese goods business in 
Shanghai from the From a name list of the so-called “law-abiding Japanese in 
China” {Anfen yu hua Riren,安分寓華日人)，which was recorded by the Shanghai 
Daotai during the first Sino-Japanese War, we may see such diversity in the 
geographical origins of the Japanese merchants at the end of twentieth century. (See 
Table 5) 
Table 5 
The Geographical Origins of the Japanese Merchants in Shanghai, 1894 
Geographical Origin Business run in Shanghai Location 
Hokkaido (北t^M) Kelp Company 
Japanese Goods Store F證h Concession 
Sundries Store 
Osaka (大阪府） Sundries Store 
Instrument Company American Settlement 
Ginning Workshop 
Niigata (新鶴縣） Photo Studio 
Hiroshima (廣島縣） Sundries Store 




Kagawa (衝 11縣） Flower Workshop 
Ginning Machine Shop American Settlement 
Shop for Shoes 
Tokyo (東京府） Haircut Shop 
Haircut Shop 
Nagasaki (長崎縣） Hawksbill Shop 
Inn 
Japanese Clothes Store 
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Sundries Store & Dye house 
Sundries Store & Dye house 
Chiba (千葉縣） Haircut Shop 
Kumamoto (熊本縣） Shop for Shoes 
Ginning Machine Shop 
Kyoto (京都府） ...—— 
Business Company French Concession 
Source: The name list of the "law-abiding Japanese in China，，{Anfen yu hua ri ren, “安 
分寓華日人”)，see QJZRHGXSL, Juan 6, pp.3802-23 
According to this name list of 184 Japanese people (110 men, 71 women, 3 
children), Nagasaki indeed ranked first as a source of the Japanese immigrants in the 
city, which provided nearly one-third of their community (61 out of 184). However, 
nearly half o f these Nagasaki people (29 out of 61) were maids of the foreign families in 
Shanghai. The second large source was people from Osaka (37 out of 184)，most of who 
served as the shop owners or the employees in the Japanese stores and firms. While 
other 20 prefectures of Japan have also appeared in this list, we may find three dominant 
areas (always formed by two adjacent prefectures) of these various geographical origins: 
"Nagasaki-Kumamoto" area (長崎-熊本）in Kyushu; "Osaka-Hyogo" area (大阪-兵庫） 
in Kansai (閧西)，and "Tokyo-Kanagawa" area (東京-神奈川） in Kanto (閧東(严 
which forms an arrow from the western part to the eastern part of Japan. 
Besides the information of the geographical origins of Japanese people in the city, 
such name list also shows the fact that the Japanese community had started their moving 
to Hongkou district from late nineteenth century. While Table 5 shows that three-fifths 
of Japanese businesses in Shanghai were located in the American Settlement, namely in 
the Hongkou district, nearly two-thirds of Japanese population lived in the same area. 
Why the Japanese people chose to gather in Hongkou? I argue that the activity of 
Japanese diplomatic branch, shipping firms and religious enterprise had important 
implications for the formation of Japanese community in Shanghai: In 1873，the 
Japanese Consulate, which was considered the representation of Japanese government 
in Shanghai, had moved from British Settlement to a building in Hongkou district,^^ 
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which located on the Huangpu waterfront. The Consul had served as the governor of the 
Japanese community, while some communal services and organizations, such as postal 
services and the “Japanese club", had been first developed by the Consulate. Moreover, 
the wharf of Mitsubishi (later became the "Japan Mail Steamship Co.’，）was just located 
on the Hongkou waterfront, blocks away from Japanese Consulate，^ where became the 
first stop for most of the new Japanese migrants to the city. Thirdly, a Japanese Buddhist 
temple, the Higashi Honganji Temple (東本願寺)，established by Oguri Sukocho (小栗 
棲香頂) in 1876, were also located near to the Japanese Consulate on the comer of 
Wuchang Road (武昌路）and Zhapu Road (乍浦路 ) . I t had not only served as a 
religious center for the Japanese community, but also performed as an educational 
enterprise and had provided most of the communal services in the early period of 
Japanese community in the city.卯 
Thus, from the end of 1870s, when these political, commercial, and religious 
centers for the Japanese society had been simultaneously established in Hongkou 
district, the main part of their community inevitably developed in a concentric-circle 
model through the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, until some 
other forces finally broke this kind of balanced structure. Hongkou district, where had 
been called "the Cinderella among the settlements", developed into a Japanese kingdom 
and became "Little Japan” in Shanghai. What kind of role had the Japanese Consulate 
played in the development of the Japanese community in Shanghai? How did they 
change Hongkou into a "Japan town"? What was the relationship like between the 
consulate and those ordinary Japanese migrants? How did Japan's big enterprises 
influence and shape the formation of the Japanese community in Shanghai? ... A l l these 
questions wi l l be discussed in detail in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ADMINISTRATION STRUCTURE AND THE POWER SYSTEM 
Japanese Consulate in Shanghai 
In spite of the fact that the roles and responsibilities of consuls have evolved over 
time in history, their most fundamental function, which has never been lost, is always 
two-fold: to further their national interest and to take care of their fellow expatriates on 
the foreign soil. However, during the century of the treaty port system, the job of the 
foreign consul in China was unique comparing with that of consuls in other places. H. B. 
Morse's description is worth quoting in illustration of such ways developed with the 
unequal treaty system in China: 
"Commissioned to other countries, a consul is no more than the commercial agent of 
his government; but, in a country which has granted the privileges of 
extraterritoriality, he is charged with such important diplomatic and judicial powers 
as to remove him into a different class. In China these powers have, in the main, 
been exercised in a dignified way by most of the consuls of most of the greater, and 
many of the minor, powers, and the consuls of all nations have had an importance 
such as is not known elsewhere.〃咖 
The turbulence and fragmentation of Chinese politics had influenced and even helped 
form such roles of the individual consuls in China.'®' A famous British diplomat 
summarized that the function of the foreign consul in Chinese treaty ports "was not 
merely commercial, but political, judicial, one might even say universal", and his duty 
was “to protect the interest and exterritorial rights of their countrymen; to see that the 
treaties were carried out; and in case of an infraction of treaty rights to obtain redress as 
best they could”， 
As to the Japanese experience in Shanghai, Christian Henriot argues that "of all 
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the foreign communities in Shanghai, and probably in China, the Japanese were beyond 
any doubt the most organized and regulated," and he insists that this must have to do 
with "the strong involvement of the state in the control of its subjects，，.⑴〗it i s obvious 
that this kind of control would not be possible without its diplomatic branch and 
representative in the city, namely the Japanese Consulate and Consul in Shanghai. 
The Japanese Consul or Consul-General in Shanghai served likewise as the judge, 
chief investigator, chief of the consular police and head of the Japanese resident 
community. However, the role he played and the way he performed varied from time to 
time according to the different period of Japanese presence in the city, and the different 
status of Japan in East Asia. Thus, his relation with Japanese resident community in 
Shanghai also changed over time. 
Since Japan was a latecomer to Shanghai and had not joined the club of the treaty 
port powers before 1895，the role of Japanese Consul in Shanghai was more 
complicated than those of western powers before the signing of the Shiminoseki Treaty. 
During that period of time, Shanghai was one of the earliest destinations to Japanese 
expatriates to China and attracted nearly ninety percent of these immigrants (See Table 
6), so the Shanghai Consul hardly had any model to follow when he served as the head 
of his countrymen, and we may regard his performance in Shanghai was the pilot run of 
the Japanese authorities in China. 
Table 6 
The Proportion of Japanese in Shanghai (1889-1892) 
1889 1890 1891 1892 
Shanghai 639 734 751 896 
China 757 864 867 1016 
Proportion 84% 85% 87% 88% 
Source: Nihon teikoku tdkei nenkan, Vol.9-12. 
As a consul in a "virgin land", the primary role of the Shanghai Consul was the 
organizer of the Japanese commercial activities in Shanghai. Without any exterritorial 
privileges, it was not easy for the Japanese firms to open the Chinese market. The only 
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aid was from the government at home and the diplomatic branches overseas. Japanese 
government played a major role in supporting his national enterprises financially, but it 
was the consul who helped big Japanese firms establish their branches in Shanghai. As 
the chief investigator, he investigated and furthered the Chinese trading information to 
the traders in the city and other firms at home. The consul also needed to coordinate the 
relationship between their national companies and the foreign competitors. The first 
Japanese consul in Shanghai，for example, Shinagawa Tadamichi (品川忠道）organized 
the first Japanese commercial association overseas, "Shanghai Trade Union" (Shanhai 
Shodokai,上海商同会)，in 1880s. Such association united the Shanghai branches of 
three main Japanese firms, Kogyo Firm (廣業洋行)，Mitsubishi Kaisha (三菱会社）and 
Mitsui Bussan (Mitsui Trading Company,三井物產)，which helped these “Direct Sale 
Firms" (Chokuyu Shosha,直輸商；社）and shipping company connected their local 
system with the overseas trading network, and furthered their businesses along the 
Yangtze R i v e r . ！。* However, since the Japanese investment scale in Shanghai was rather 
small during the meanwhile the consul had to try his best to protect his people 
and regulate their behavior in Shanghai. 
Among the early resident Japanese in China and Korea, there were a large group 
of uneducated people who made their living by small trading, doing skilled labors, and 
other humble professions. In order to prevent acts of misconduct and regulate the 
indecent behaviors, which may harm Japanese national honor, the consul had to issue 
orders to punish those undesirable nationals. Thus, in 1880s, Gaimusho issued a series 
of rules called "Disciplinary Rules for Japanese Residents in China and Korea"(清国及 
朝鮮国在留曰本人取締規則)，by which the local consuls regulated the Japanese 
residential affairs.'®^ 
In Shanghai "Disciplinary Rules of Shanghai Japanese Residents in China"(清国 
上海居留民曰本人取締規則）was promulgated on September, 24, 1883. Among these 
strict rules, while some rules with regard to the movement and trading activities of 
Japanese residents were rather complicated (such as, "all those who wanted to run 
restaurants and inns in Shanghai must follow the established practices that they must 
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apply and get the permission from the consulate before they started their business"; 
"those who wanted to run stores in the city needed to report to the consulate three days 
prior，，; “those who had just arrived in Shanghai must report his arrival in 48 hours, i f he 
failed to do so, he would have to explain the reasons"; "the personal information one 
needed to report on his arrival included one's geographical origin, identity, address in 
Shanghai, name, age, date of arrival, and etc. other movements, such as departure, 
traveling, moving, should be reported to the consulate one day prior，，； "one could not 
travel outside Shanghai without a passport"; and etc.), other rules concerning the daily 
behaviors of Japanese residents were even more inflexible (such as, "one must not go 
out hatless’，； "women were not allowed to have short hair or wear men's clothing"; 
"Japanese residents must not earn their living as beggars or dress up like beggars"; "one 
must not tattoo body, no matter on one's own body or on others"; and etc.). A l l those 
who offended against these rules would be detained for up to ten days or would be fined 
of five sen to one yuan ninety-five sen，In the early twentieth century, a new rule, 
"Regulations of Shanghai Japanese Residents"(上海在留民規貝Ij)，was put into effect 
with some certain regulations revised, however, the substantive provisions remained 
similar to the former 
However, before the first Sino-Japanese war, the Japanese brothels, singsong 
houses, and teahouses located in Hongkou district and in the former British Settlement 
became one of the thorniest problems the Japanese Consul in Shanghai faced. He 
regarded all these places and those Japanese females inside these places as offences 
against decency, which harmed the Japanese national honor and impaired the image of 
Japanese community in the city. Thus, in compliance with the request from the 
Shanghai Consul, some policemen were dispatched by the Japanese government in 1884. 
While their purpose was to help maintain the public security of the Japanese community 
in Shanghai, the main target was to manage these Japanese brothels and teahouses. 
Some main organizers were arrested, teahouses and other places were closed, these 
Japanese females were repatriated and most of whom were banished to Singapore and 
Hong Kong. 109 
Even though the consul had also served as the protector of their countrymen when 
he negotiated with the Qing officers，】^o he was rather the real "governor-general" of the 
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Japanese community, at least inside their central realms in Hongkou district. Thus, some 
historians just regard that the consul in Chinese treaty ports acted just as "an elected 
mayor might do in any town."' ' ‘ 
Why the local consul had so close relation with their resident people? Why he 
tried to control his nationals' daily lives outside their country where the administrative 
system was effective in the foreign society? Why the rules formulated by their 
government were so strict and comprehensive that paid attention to nearly every detail 
of Japanese residents' daily lives? 
Besides the reason that the Japanese overseas communities consisted largely of 
people from grassroots level, some other factors of Japanese situation in East Asia and 
the realities in Shanghai foreign societies had also influenced Gaimusho's policy and 
determined the consul's early performance in China, and especially in Shanghai. 
First, Japanese international status during the early years of their modernization 
period decided that their nationals in Shanghai were only "the second-class citizen" 
inside the foreign society. Like China, Japan also "faced the same challenge from the 
West in the nineteenth century", though their ‘“opening，was less traumatic than 
China's". The Meij i Modernization brought radical changes to their society, while 
the national unification and modernization (or, we can say, "westernization") was 
promoted by most Meij i leaders. However, the unequal treaties had not been relaxed 
until the end of nineteenth century, and their strong national self-respect had not been 
strengthened even before 1905，when they succeeded in the Russo-Japanese war. Thus 
before that, the scale and development of Japanese community had been kept in a 
modest way in Shanghai and even in other Chinese treaty ports. Their relatively small 
population, their low status in the foreign clan in the city, their status without the 
exterritorial privileges (may also combine with the fact that they were non-European 
nationals who have similar appearance with the Chinese, especially in the Westerner's 
eyes) decided that they were not really regarded, by the westerners and even the 
Chinese, as one member of the foreign society in the foreign settlements. Hence, at the 
time, they had no representative in the SMC and no other self-rule organizations, the 
Japanese community had to completely rely on their home officials in order to survive 
in Shanghai. 
Secondly, even though Shanghai was a city in a declining empire, it was also the 
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center of the western presence in East Asia，and for most Japanese, Shanghai, especially 
“the central district" of the International Settlement, was the symbol of western life style, 
namely the life style of the civilized world. (See Chapter One) The consul, even his 
foreign ministry, regarded that it was his duty to keep all their humble nationals behave 
decently. However, the triple intervention happened after the Shimonoseki Treaty had 
changed such respect into resentment.� 
Lastly, unlike other foreign governments who tried to keep their influence in the 
lowest level, the Japanese government, on its way to imperialism, had the tendency of 
tightening up their control of their foreign societies. Other foreign consuls in Shanghai 
could not interfere directly with the administrative of the International Settlement, 
where lived most Japanese in Shanghai, Also unlike other foreign consuls in Shanghai 
who had to contact their ambassador or highest envoy in China, the Japanese Consul 
was in the constant and direct communication with his foreign minister, which enable 
him forward the Gaimusho's policy directly to their nationals. Thus, the consul in 
Shanghai also possessed greater authority to negotiate with the Daotai，"* when the 
authority had finally legalized after the signing of Shimonoseki. Under such a system, 
the Japanese community in Shanghai, gathered around their consulate, had established 
an invisible boundary even inside the International Settlement. 
Since more formal concession areas were clarified in an agreement of 1896, the 
Gaimusho began to present formal guidelines for managing Japan's concession areas 
both in Korea and China to the Japanese Diet, which became legislation in 1906. These 
ordinances emphasized the authority of the Japanese consulates over the oversea 
communities and also earmarked funds to aid in operation schools and hospitals. And 
during this period, the residents' association was established to replace part of the roles 
the consul had played before - to administrate the Japanese community, even though the 
board and the chairmanship were always appointed by the c o n s u l , n 5 
'JRA': a 'self-governing' body runs by the elites 
While the "Regulations of Japanese Residents，，was created in order to regulate the 
daily behavior and control the movement of the offshore Japanese nationals, the 
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"Residents' Association Law，’ (Kyoryu Mindan Ho,居留民團法）was enacted in 
responding to the demand of building up the corporate body in Japanese concession 
areas in Asia. 
After the Shimonoseki Treaty, the Japanese presence in East Asia grew rapidly, 
thus，how to operate those expanding communities and how to maintain the operation 
expense became a serious problem for the Japanese concession areas both in China and 
in Korea. Under such circumstances, some consulates in Korea and their local Japanese 
residents held residents' meetings and proposed some resolutions to promote the 
self-rule in the concession areas?丨6 In responding to the need to unify and protect their 
nationals abroad, the Japanese government, through the Gaimusho, enacted the 
"Residents' Association Law" on March 7，1905, and the Gaimusho followed with a 
supplementary directive on August 1 of that year. 
According to the "Residents' Association Law", the Japanese residents could 
establish the self-rule “Residents’ Association" in Chinese and Korean concession areas 
(no matter in the excluded Japanese Concessions or the International Concession areas) 
to administrate the community by themselves. However, this kind of self-administration 
must be supervised by the local consuls and under the direction of the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry. 117 
In some respects, it is not groundless to argue that the Japanese self-rule of 
concession areas in China was “a by-product of Japan's tightening grip on Korea"/^^ 
however in Shanghai, the demand to establish a united and self-administrative 
organization for local Japanese community had existed for a long time, especially 
among the elite class. It is difficult to trace the origins of the early organizations of 
Japanese community in Shanghai, but even as early as the 1880s，there existed some 
kind of such organizations inside the Japanese Consulate, of which most members came 
from the main Japanese enterprises, and of course from the elite class.'^^ At the time, 
the yelling for the self-rule and a more united Japanese community had appeared among 
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the Japanese people, the Japanese club also raised a similar motto in their first 
meeting held in the Japanese C o n s u l a t e . ⑵ After the founding of "Shanghai Club" 
(established by the Britons), the “Customs Club” and the "Germany Club", it became 
the third similar organization established by the foreign resident civilians in the c i ty. 122 
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However, due to a lack of fiinds (because of the lack of members), the club activities 
had been turned into parties of their member, and such organization had disappeared 
before the end of nineteenth century. During the last several years in the nineteenth 
century, several other Japanese clubs, even included a sport club, had been organized, 
however, no one survived long enough. 
Such a trend, interrupted by the first Sino-Japanese War, revived when the "new 
era，，came. In the early twentieth century, several new Japanese associations was 
founded by different groups of people: some Tokyo Imperial University (Tokyo Teikoku 
daigaku 東京帝國大學）graduates founded “Red Gate Club" (Akamon Kurabu 赤門 
俱樂部)，which located on Zhapu Road (乍浦路)；while another organization called 
Mizunoto Association (癸卯會）was established on Nanxun Road (南簿路).丨 2〗These 
two clubs merged into one united "Japanese Club" in 1904 and a larger residents' club, 
the famous "Shanghai Japanese Club", came into being when the three main Japanese 
clubs united into one in 1908. (See Figure 1) 
Figure 1 
Shanghai Japanese Clubs (1903-1908) 
Red Gate Club Mizunoto Association 
赤門俱樂部* 癸卯會 
(1903) (1903) 
~ ~ . I ~ ~ 
Japanese Club Japanese Business Club Koyukai 
曰本人俱樂部 日本實業俱樂部 滬友會 
(1904) (1906) (?) 
‘ ~ I ~ ~ 1 
Shanghai Japanese Club 
上海日本人俱樂部 
(1908) 
Source: "The origin of Japanese Club", in Yonezawa Hideo, Shanhai Shiwa, 
p. 199. 
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Since all of the Japanese clubs and organizations were established by certain 
groups of people, especially the big Japanese tradesmen and elites, their functions and 
operation areas were limited. Even though they had gained their funds from the 
membership dues, and edifice was erected for meeting, gathering and recreation, it was 
impossible for them to function as a full-time and professional manager to their 
community. But they had become the fundamental central members among the Japanese 
civilians in the city, based on whom the "Japanese Residents' Association" (JRA) was 
established. 
On December 17, 1905, a Japanese Association (Nihonjin Kyokai,日本人協會) 
was founded at a joint meeting held by the Japanese Club and the Japanese Business 
Club in the Japanese Consulate. Several days later Consul-General Nagataki Hisakichi 
(71<清•久吉）appointed a thirty-member board and named Ito Yonejiro (伊東米治良 i t s 
first chairman. This association took over the management of an elementary school 
from the Shanghai branch of the Higashi Honganji Temple, which had seen to its 
operation since it was initially set up in 1890. The Japanese Cemetery, located on land 
purchased by the consulate in 1873 and long run by the Higashi Honganji, and the 
Japanese Volunteer Corps were also placed into hands o f the Japanese Associat ion」24 
Further expansion of the Japanese community during the post-Russo-Japanese 
War period demanded a more powerful self-rule organization who could serve as a kind 
of public institution with social and political significance. However, this Japanese 
association could not meet such goals. Thus, the suggestion for "a more powerful 
Japanese corporation" had been proposed. The former Japanese Association was soon 
replaced by the "Japanese Residents' Association" on September 1st, 1907. The new 
organization would govern all the Japanese citizens in the International Settlement, 
French Concession, and two kilometers beyond the foreign concession barriers. 
In the following years, the main concern of the JRA was how to levy taxes from 
the local Japanese in order to maintain their communal work. These taxes can be 
distinguished into two main parts: income tax and business tax. While the income tax 
payers were those who earn their livings by salaries and other stable incomes, the 
business tax payers were those enterprisers and traders who ran their own businesses. 
Other various service fees had also collected from the different trades. ^ ^^  Even though 
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they managed to regulate taxes on the local community and the tax income was of a 
quite respectable sum which enabled them develop their communal duties, we cannot 
regard it as a real self-rule administrative organization for the Japanese community (like 
SMC for the International Settlement), since this body was really controlled by the 
Consul, but not by the Japanese civilians themselves. It was the Consul in Shanghai 
who formed a Residents' Council (Kyoryu min kai,居留民會） in 1908 in compliance 
with a consular order, and the members of which were also determined by him. 
However, in 1925, a detailed regulation of Shanghai Japanese Residents' 
Association was issued by the Shanghai Consul, in which many aspects including the 
election of the Residents' Council, the structuring of the Association, the taxation 
system, and etc. were finally clarified. ^ ^^  From this document, we may leam more 
about how the JRA ran and how they administrated the Japanese community. And from 
then on, JRA had been steadily turned into a more self-dependent administrative entity. 
This regulation prescribed that all the male Japanese civilians and corporation owners in 
Shanghai who had paid taxes for more than six months were entitled to vote for the 
councilmen in the JRA. The voter registration would be held from each year's 
D e c e m b e r 31 St to the last day of January of the following year. Person's name, address, 
profession would be recorded when he registered as a voter, while the corporation 
owners would be required to provide the information such as the name of his 
corporation, its location in the city, what kind of taxes and how much he had paid, and 
when he paid tax for the first time. The size of the Residents' council had finally been 
fixed at 60 by the Gaimush5, which was responding to the growing size of the Japanese 
community in Shanghai. Al l the councilmen would need to receive at least one seventh 
of the votes, while the Chairman and the Vice-chairman should receive more than half 
of the votes. 
An administrative committee, consisted of seven administrative members and 
three reserve members, was formed in order to maintain the daily operation of the JRA. 
The treasurer under this committee must report the ending balances of the accounts in 
every three months to the Consul. And the annual report would be proposed to the 
"Japanese Residents' Meeting", while the Chairman of the Residents' Council would 
also send an inspector to review the treasurer's work. Even though, at this time, the 
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members of Residents' Council were elected by the Japanese tax-payers and were no 
longer decided by the Consul, it was still the Consul's right to perform as the 
superintendent of the whole JRA. (See Figure 2) 
Figure 2 
The Structure of Japanese Residents' Association 
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As the self-governing body of the Japanese Community, JRA was mainly run by 
the elite class. No matter the imelected management group or the elected Residents' 
Council, the manage class of JRA were always dominated by those managers from 
significant Japanese firms in the city and the Shanghai branch of the 
government-sponsored Japanese enterprises, while a little group of intellectuals, doctors, 
lawyers had also joined them. Take, for instance, the members of the JRA 
Administrative Committee in 1915 and 1922 (See Table VII): The branch managers of 
six major Japanese enterprises in China (N.Y.K., Bank of Taiwan, Yokohama Specie 
Bank, Manchuria Railway, Mitsubishi, and Mitsui) were included in both of the two 
years' name lists. Other familiar names, such as "Okura"(大倉)，"Sumitomo"(住友)， 
“T5a Kogyo"(東亞興業)，were also included in this table. Based on this information, 
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we may regard that JRA mainly consisted of the leaders or the owners of major 
Japanese banks, navigation companies, commercial firms, big local stores and Japanese 
cotton mills. In 1915, among the twenty members of the Administrative Committee, 
there were seven members came from different professional services (five doctors, one 
journalist, and one lawyer), while the proportion of these professionals dropped from 
thirty-five percent in 1915 to ten percent in 1922. And more cotton mil l owners and 
local commercial firms' runners replaced their places in JRA. 
Table 7 
The Members of JRA Administrative Committee in 1915 and 1922 
1915 
Post Name Profession Name Profession 
, T 1 •• Branch Manager 
Chairman Ishii / t v t v t ^ � Suzuki Journalist 
(IM. Y.JN..) 
Vice-chairman Hata Manager Branch Manager 
(DaishinYoho) (N.Y.K.) 
Treasurer Ezaki Branch Manager ^ori Branch Manager 
(Bank of Taiwan) (Toa Kogyo) 
^ - . .丄 Branch Manager 
Admtmstrative � . Branch Manager 
, , , Godamu (Yokohama Specie Sakura 
Members 己占打让） (Manchuria Railway) 
. Branch Manager Branch Manager 
Shiboi … 1 o , ， . � Morimoto ^ 
(Takada Shokai) (Shanghai Exchange) 
Branch Manager 
Kibata (Nisshin Kisen Tanobe Manager 
Kaisha) (Nikka Cotton Mill) 
Branch Manager 
H如da (Mitsubishi) Nohiu Manager (Mitsui) 
_ , H Branch Manager 
Branch Manager _ 




^ , … ， … , Branch Manager 
•no (Shanghai Cotton Yamaguchi 
MU) (N.Y.K.)——— 
Manager 
Suzuki Journalist Fukushimu 
(Gosho) 
^ _ Branch Manager 
Sasaki Doctor Yanogida 
(Bank of Taiwan) 
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Shinozaki Doctor Mutsushimu Branch Manager 
(Sumitomo Bank) 
Manager 
Nakano Doctor Kawamura (Naigai Wata 
Cotton Mill) 
Yoshimusu Doctor Yamaguchi Shop owner 
(Yamaguchi Store) 
Suzuki Doctor Yoshizumi Doctor 
K o u n o M a n a g e r ” ^ ； ： ； ； ^ S h ^ : - -
(OkuraYoho) (Saisedo) 
Hatabu Manager (Mitsui) Ominami Manager 
(Shitai Yoho) 
Reserve Baba Branch Manager 
Musuo Shop Owner 
Members (Nisshin Yoho) (Musuo Yoho) 
Branch Manager 
Murai (Manchuria Ishizaki Owner 
Railway) (八脇 ha) 
Murakami Lawyer Yokota Manager 
(Nihon Keran) 
Source: Uchiyama Kiyoshi, Greater Shanghai, p. 200; Chen Zu'en, "Shanhai 
Kyoryu Mindan" ("Japanese in Shanghai" no. 24, in Shanghai Walker, Shanghai, 
December, 2002). 
Thus, for the Japanese community, these branch managers and the people who ran 
their own business in Shanghai not only dominated their economic, financial lives, but 
also decided their communal affairs. I am not going to argue that it was the Japanese 
community's tendency towards “elitism，，- nearly all of the main foreign communities 
in Shanghai were led by a small body of their own nationals which consisted of their 
local diplomats, big trading company owners, and expert persons, yet, the elite of the 
Japanese community in Shanghai had their own special characteristics. 
First, most of these main Japanese companies had deep relations with their 
government, which were called as “national policy enterprises" (Kokusaku K i g y o ,國 
策企業)• Japanese government gave these enterprises inclining policies, based on which 
they had gained huge amount of profits in Shanghai and even in other Chinese treaty 
port cities. Thus we can rarely hear their voices differed from what the consul said. 
In fact, they, like the consul, represented the Japanese government rather than their 
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whole community; they just assisted the consul and Gaimusho promote their policies, 
maintain the communal services in Shanghai rather than administrate their community 
by themselves. On the other hand, even though these elites were more open-minded, 
better-educated, and had more direct contact with both of the westerners and Chinese 
than the large amount of their ordinary folks in the city, they kept their community 
developing in an extremely extrinsic way. Even though the institution of JRA was 
slightly different from the system of their basic municipal system (市町丰寸 Shichoson) 
at home, the rules set up for the Japanese tax payers, the educational system run for the 
Japanese schools in Shanghai and even the uniform of Shanghai Japanese Volunteers 
were the same as in their own country. They had designed a life style that resembles 
Japanese lives at h o m e ? 
While “the role of the consul as the headquarters of the community is 
highlighted，’，130 we still cannot ignore the role the JRA and the Japanese from elite 
class in Shanghai played in their community: They help establish the administrative 
system of their local community; They dedicated to uniting and maintaining an 
exclusive Japanese entity in the city; And most remarkably, they maintained most of the 
public services and communal duties of Japanese community by the sources from the 
tax revenues they collected, the government funding, and financial supports from big 
Japanese firms. 
Public services and communal duties 
The municipal council of International Settlement had provided basic public 
services, such as the policing institution (consisted of the major foreign powers and the 
Chinese people), schools with different levels, hospitals, cemeteries and etc., to the 
foreign people lived inside. However, since the European-American people had 
dominated the SMC, the services they provided failed to meet the need of the Japanese 
community. Besides, Japanese themselves, who did not deeply engaged in the municipal 
affairs in the SMC, concentrated in their own "kingdom", especially before the 1920s. 
Before 1907, it was the consul together with other organizations, such as Higashi 
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Honganji Temple, the Japanese Association, administrated the public services for the 
relatively small Japanese community in Shanghai. After the JRA was established, most 
of these public services and communal duties were transferred to their hands. Since the 
JRA had more stable resources than those religious enterprises and other 
nongovernmental organizations, the public services and communal duties of Japanese 
community developed continuously under their long-term efforts. Among all the 
services the JRA provided, the most important projects included education, policing and 
public safety, public health, welfare, charity, crematoria services and cemeteries. Here, I 
would only introduce part of the services they had provided. 
The JRA-run schools and their school system in Shanghai 
When Japan opened herself to the world in 1868，one of the government's high 
priorities was catching up with Western standards in science and education. The 
Japanese education system was reformed mainly according to the German and French 
model which experts regarded as most suitable and advantageous. Japan's modem 
school system was developed in the same period. In 1872 the school systems for the 
elementary, secondary, and higher level schooling were established according to the 
idea of equal opportunity for education. Among all those reforms, the most important 
thing was the introduction of the compulsory education. 
As for the Japanese schools in Shanghai, they were developed in three different 
periods: "Honganji period’，，"Japanese Association period", and the "JRA period". 
The first Japanese school in Shanghai was run by the Higashi Honganji Temple� 
which located in the Hongkou district. A study group called "Shinai Sha"(親愛舍）was 
first established as early as 1876 for those Japanese females who had married foreigners 
and migrated to Shanghai. Later it had been turned into some kind of a private primary 
school which taught spelling, reading, and arithmetic. When more local Japanese 
children were attracted to this school, it was renamed Kaido Elementary School (開導 
学校）by the consul in 1888. Despite of its small scale (the sUadent number was less 
than twenty before the first Sino-Japanese War), this school followed the Japanese 
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government orders of primary schools, and English language was taught to those 
students of higher grades in order to match the criterion in Tokyo. Except for some 
slight differences, this school was operated in the same way as those primary schools in 
Japan. For example, the textbooks adopted in this school were same as those in 
Nagasaki. Even though this Japanese school in Shanghai had been initiated and 
supported by a Buddhist Temple, the Japanese Consul soon took over its management 
and handed it to Japanese Association one year after its establishment in 1905. An 
educational committee was founded to control the budget and administrate other affairs 
related to this school. Two years later, when the Japanese Association had been replaced 
by the JRA, this school was officially renamed "Shanghai JRA Japanese Higher Primary 
Schoo l "(上海居留民団立日本尋常高等小學校）and the Japanese Ministry of 
Education soon accredited it.⑴ 
The school had moved out of the Higashi Honganji Temple to new site on North 
Sichuan Road because of the enrollment expansion. However due to lack of classroom 
space, the school had to rent the former school house ofToa Dobun Shoin (東亞同文書 
院) to establish a branch to contain more students in 1910s. A new branch was built on 
Pingliang Road (平涼路）in 1923，which separated from the original "Higher Primary 
School" and renamed "East District Shanghai JRA Japanese Higher Primary School" in 
1926. Two more “higher primary schools", the Middle District and West District Higher 
Primary Schools, were established to enroll more Japanese teenagers in S h a n g h a i ] 
(See Table VII I) 
Table 8 
The Enrollment of Japanese Primary Schools in Shanghai (1911-1932) 
Higher Higher Higher 
Higher 
Primary School Primary School Primary School 
Primary School 














1923 1403 133 
1924 1357 177 
1925 1402 180 
1926 1463 133 
1927 1175 239 119 
1928 1458 329 257 
1929 836 366 311 751 
1930 961 428 329 821 
1931 1036 478 398 896 
193 2 ^ 238 96 597 
Source: Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan, Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan Ritsu Gakkd Ichiran, 
p. 21. 
These Japanese higher primary schools actually were a combination of elementary 
school and middle school, which recruited students from six years old to fourteen years 
old. The first six-year was equal to the elementary period, while the two years after was 
the higher standard period. When students entered the latter period, they would be able 
to leam English, Chinese, painting or other commercial curriculum. When the student 
graduated from these primary schools, they could choose to go back to Japan for higher 
education or enter one of the middle or higher specialized schools in Shanghai. These 
schools, including a high school for girls and two other business schools only for boys, 
were also erected by the JRA in the late 1920s. Besides those basic courses, the 
curriculum in girls' high school also included moral training, home economics, 
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needlework, handcraft, and etc., while other two business schools taught more 
professional skills, such as business writing, abacus arithmetic, and etc., which all 
related to business and finance. Also, a private kindergarten which was first 
established by a Japanese trader was finally attached to the Higher Primary School in 
1910, and later moved to the "Japanese Girls' High School，，（日本高等女學校）due to 
the lack of space，(See Table IX) 
A l l these educational institutions run by the JRA were maintained by the taxes 
revenues and other financial supports from Japanese companies and banks. Based on 
certain rules of Japanese Ministry of Education, the teachers and other staffs in these 
schools had got quite good salaries. Thus, many good teachers from Japan were 
recruited and the educational quality of these Japanese schools was guaranteed. As 
overseas Japanese schools accredited by the Ministry of Education, these schools 
followed a set of rules in order to keep themselves the same quality as those schools at 
home. Since compulsory education to all children from the age of six to fourteen years 
were maintained in modem Japan, it was the responsibility of the JRA in Shanghai to 
provide sufficient educational facilities for their children and ensure that all the 
school-aged children were admitted to the primary schools. 
Through the school education, the communal structures maintained by the JRA 
reinforced values acquired in Japan. The values such as imperialism, militarism were 
associated with their public school education, and emphasized in their textbooks. 
The Japanese school system in Shanghai developed exclusively. The teaching 
language was one of the major reasons that why their children failed to enter the 
Municipal Schools in Shanghai. But the idea of maintain a strictly same educational 
system as it at home promoted the establishment of the JRA primary schools in the city. 
Even though they had once applied for the "Grant-in-Aid" from the SMC of the 
International Settlement, the SMC refused to provide any grant because their policy was 
"precluded from contributing to the maintenance of purely national schools."'^^ 
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American，British and French trade delegations residing in Shanghai.丨彳。The resultant 
international defense organization acted as municipal militia for the international 
community in Shanghai, and eventually had representation from twenty nationalities, 
including a Russian contingent. The corps mobilized a number of times, usually in 
response to riots but sometimes to augment the regular foreign garrisons or 
expeditionary forces, such as during the Tai Ping Rebellion, 1860-1862, and the Boxer 
Rebellion of 1900. The Japanese disbanded the corps during their occupation of the city. 
There were twenty-three units in the Shanghai Volunteer Corps: the Light Horse, 
American Troop, Shanghai Field Battery, Shanghai Light Battery, Shanghai Field 
Company, Armored Car Company, 'A' Company, 'B' Company, American Company, 
Portuguese Company, Japanese Company, Chinese Company, Shanghai Scottish, Jewish 
Company, Philippine Company, American Machine Gun Company, American 
Reservists' Company, Transport Company, Inter-communication Company, Interpreter 
Company, Air Defense Company, Public School Cadet Company, and the Russian 
Regiment. Most of the Russian Regiment was comprised of paid men. A l l other units 
were voluntary. 
As for the Japanese branch in the SVC, it was founded by the frightened Japanese 
residents in the city during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900.⑷ According to the structuring 
of the SVC, 120 Japanese were selected from the Japanese community and established 
this Giyutai (義勇隊）on June 28, 1900. A month later, it joined the SVC in the 
International Settlement. The Japanese company was rather small in comparison to the 
British branches, which was of 45 members and three officials in 1915.】42 With the 
creation of the JRA, the management of the Japanese Volunteers fell to it in 1907.''^ ^ 
Not only providing the operation expenses, the JRA also administrated their daily 
training, which was one hundred percent Japanese style of military training. They also 
changed their British styled uniforms to the Japanese style, and attached the insignia of 
Japanese imperial army to their caps]** 
Even though the commissions of the Japanese company was authorized by the 
SMC based on the Commandant's recommendations and their goals was to maintain the 
security neutrality of the International Settlement, the Japanese Consul and the JRA had 
always regarded this military force the safeguard of their own community. 
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Public health service 
Even though little was recorded about the public health and hygiene services of 
the Japanese community, there was a certain amount of annual budget from the JRA was 
set aside for the health service, especially for an Infectious Disease Hospital (Hibyoin 
避病院）run by the International Settlement.⑷ Before 1934，there were no JRA-mn 
hospitals in Shanghai , but there were certain amount of Japanese doctors who 
practiced medicine in Shanghai and served for the JRA administrative committee in the 
early twentieth century, because doctors were respected in the Japanese community. 
Besides, the JRA also financially support those Japanese doctors and nurses who 
worked in the International Settlement hospitals」47 
The first Japanese doctor was invited by the first Japanese consul Shinagawa to 
serve the Japanese residents in the hospital run by Higashi Honganji Temple?48 From 
1906 to 1914 period, there were 1001 Japanese residents died in Shanghai, most of them 
were killed by infectious diseases such as meningitis, tuberculosis, typhoid, cholera, etc. 
There were 22 Japanese-run clinics in Shanghai in 1915, while the scale of these 
Japanese clinics was not very big: usually consist of only one doctor with a pharmacist 
or an assistant and a n u r s e . A c c o r d i n g to the statistics of 1924, there were 44 
Japanese-run clinics in Shanghai, included pediatrics, dentistry and ophthalmology 
clinics.i5° 
Other services 
The Japanese Cemetery in Shanghai, which located on land purchased by the 
consulate in 1873，had long been run by the Higashi Honganji Temple before 1905, 
while the crematoria service was also provided. The daily affairs, such as clearing, 
administration, managing the burial rites, had been long held by the Japanese religious 
enterprises in Shanghai and gained financial supports from the Japanese companies in 
the city. Later in 1907，it was handed to the JRA and maintained by the tax revenues 
collected from the Japanese community. ^ ^^  
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Besides all these routine services, in the year of 1927, the JRA organized special 
committees to settle the Japanese refugees who entered Shanghai during the Northern 
Expedition of the Chinese Nationalists' revolution. A Buddhist Temple and the Japanese 
school in Hongkou were provided for the Japanese residence as special accommodation. 
Most of these refugees left Shanghai to Japan by the arrangement of this committee. 
Aiding the work of the committee and consular authorities were Japanese steamship 
companies in Shanghai and railways in Japan: The N.Y.K. had granted a 20% reduction 
in fares of their tickets to Japan for these refugees and a railway in Japan had reduced its 
fares to half for the same purpose. ^ ^^  
From all these services provided by the JRA, we may clarify the roles the JRA 
played in the Japanese residential society. Rather than a "self-rule" authority, it served 
more like an administrative agency in charge of the Japanese communal affairs in the 
city. The SMC did not know their existence until late 1920s, though most of the 
Japanese councilors in SMC were serving in the JRA in the same time] 54 But, we 
cannot deny that it was the JRA who helped the Japanese Consul establish the order and 
administrate the expanding communal services inside the Japanese community. Since 
most of the Japanese residents in the city were not eligible for voting in the International 
Settlement, finally they gained their 'Velfare" from their own organization. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
TITTLE TAPAN'. A SELF-CONTAINED COMMTJISTTTY 
'Kaishaha' vs. 'Dochakuha' 
In contrast to the Euro-American communities in Shanghai, the Japanese 
community remained comparatively poor, though more and more Japanese investments 
in China were located in Shanghai in the early twentieth century. While those big 
company owners, branch managers together with their diplomatic officials dominated 
the administrative affairs of the Japanese community in Shanghai, the majority of their 
community still consisted of poorer Japanese small traders, who had come to possess 
their sole social and economic stake in Shanghai. However, under the guidance of the 
consul and the semi-governmental JRA, the Japanese civilians in Shanghai seemed to 
have been organized as an exclusive and monolithic society. 
In fact, the apparently monolithic Japanese community had been subtly stratified 
into different groups, who had different objectives and concerns for their lives in 
Shanghai. According to their different roles in the Japanese community, the 
dominant group of elite Japanese who were closely tied to the consulate, major 
corporations, banks and textile factories, together with some of big firms' high rank 
employees, were dubbed the "Kaishaha"(會社派）or "Company Faction"; While a large 
number of ordinary Japanese folks, who were largely gathered in Hongkou district in 
Shanghai, were called "Dochakuha" (土著派）or ‘‘Native Faction". It is difficult to 
estimate that how many proportions these two groups respectively accounted for, even 
though some historians argue that the "Company Faction" accounted for “no more than 
5 percent of the Japanese in Shanghai". 
According to the statistics recorded by the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai, during 
the early twentieth century nearly 70 percent of Japanese populations in Shanghai Area 
(included some other cities near Shanghai) were engaged in trading, navigation, and 
other businesses (See Table 10): 
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Table 10 
The Proportions of Japanese Population in Different Professions in the Early 
1910s 
1911 1912 1913 1915 1916 
Agriculture 0.08% 0.25% 0.16% 0.7% 0.63% 
Industry 19% 19.9% 20.2% 19% 18.4% 
Officers & Freelancers 7.5% 10.9% 10.5% 9.8% 7.6% 
Unemployment 3.5% 4.1% 2.2% 2.1% 2.1% 
Source: Nihon teikoku tokei nenkan. Vol. 31-37. (The figures recorded in Vol. 34 
[1914] are exactly same as those statistics in Vol. 33[1913]) 
Even though we cannot simply equal all of these 70% of Japanese populations to the 
"Native Faction", these figures show that the Japanese society in Shanghai were mainly 
made up by the businessmen who had been distinguished into two separated groups. 
And the majority of the ‘"Native Faction" was involved in the trade between Japan and 
Shanghai. Most of their businesses were not large-scale ones, sometimes really small: 
the small sundry goods stores opened in the front parts of their living houses, the fish 
stalls in the Hongkou market, the small trading firms engaged in buying and selling 
whatever could make profit in the Japan and Shanghai market. Besides, all kinds of 
service establishments aiming at the local Japanese customers, such as traditional 
Japanese restaurants, inns and hotels, barber shops, repair workshops, and etc., were 
also founded by these people. Such Japanese small businesses in the city seldom 
employed any Chinese or other nationals, and sometimes it was run simply by their 
owners, mostly by a f a m i l y ] 5 7 Even i f they hired some employees, the payment was 
rather low. It was recorded that a Japanese employee of a shop in Hongkou district was 
only C$50 or C$60 per month, while the monthly stipend of a member of the Shanghai 
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Municipal Police was Most of them lived in those renovated Chinese houses 
in the Hongkou district. They were too poor to be eligible for voting for the SMC of the 
International Settlement, and they seldom had any direct contact with the westerners in 
the city, because most of them could not communicate in English. However, it was even 
hard for them to influence the communal affairs inside the Japanese society, since the 
JRA were dominated by those "Kaishaha", though it was them who were the settlers 
inside the Japanese community in Shanghai.'^^ 
The "Company Faction" included the traders, bankers, manufacturers and those 
who had been running, representing or working for mining, shipping or railway interests. 
A part of them were employed by the largest Japanese banks which all located on the 
Bund: Yokohama Specie Bank, Bank of Korea, Bank of Taiwan, Bank of Mitsubishi, 
Bank of Mitsui, Bank of Sumitomo; while others might have been hired by some of the 
most important Japanese companies: such as Nisshin Kisen Kaisha, N.Y.K., Mitsui 
Bussan, Nihon Menka (曰本綿花），and etc. Mostly lived in the former British 
settlement, they had got better living standard than those of the "Native Faction". Even 
though it is argued that their standard of living was generally lower than that of the 
British p e o p l e , s o m e high rank Japanese "Kaishaha" still had lived really "luxury" in 
Shanghai: some of them lived in the beautiful mansions in the former British Settlement, 
while they might possess another villa inside the French Concession; like those Britons 
in Shanghai, they hired Chinese "Amah"(阿女黾）as servants, or sometimes just 
employed the Japanese maids. They had direct contact with those western businessmen 
and even joined the British dominated Shanghai Club.'^' This group of people was 
regarded more open-minded than those "Native Faction", because they had more 
experience o f the west, and had direct business contact with both the Chinese and the 
westerners. They were better-educated than those “Native Faction" and their business in 
Shanghai seemed to be more s t a b l e . B u t they were more dispersed than the Japanese 
from the "Native Faction” and much more likely to move from treaty port to treaty port, 
or even leave China to other countries from time to time. Unlike those small traders, as 
the sojourning businessmen in the city, they did not intend to settle in Shanghai for the 
rest of their lives. They might have enjoyed the life here for several years, yet they 
might be transferred to some equally prestigious position in Paris or London or New 
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York.丨63 (See Table 11) 
Table 11 
The Different Status of "Kaishaha" and "Dochakuha" 
Kaishaha Dochakuha 
Branch Managers Small Traders 
Business Owners Inn Keepers 
Employees in big Japanese Small Service Business 
Professions 
Enterprises Owners 
Servicemen in SMC Professionals & Freelancers 
etc. etc. 
Hongkou District 
Former British Settlement 
Gathering Districts Zhabei District 
French Concession 
Yangshupu District 
Good: dose to the living 
Poor: same as the living 
standard of the average 
Living Standard standard of the Chinese 
Euro-Americans in 
populace in Shanghai 
Shanghai Settlements 
Direct contacts in Hardly had any contact 
Relations with Chinese & 
commercial and municipal with the westerners and 
Westerners in Shanghai 
affairs Chinese folks 
Dominated the JRA, and Only a handful of them 
Status in Japanese 
controlled nearly all their joined the JRA and had less 
Community 
communal affairs influence in the community 
Identity in Shanghai Sojourners Settlers 
The gap between these two groups of people caused dissatisfaction of the "Native 
Faction，’. They did not satisfy with the stratification within the Japanese community. For 
example, the Japanese candidates for councilors of the SMC were always selected from 
the "Company Faction”，for the official language of the SMC was English and the 
councilors had to communicate in this language」64 In order to avoid serious friction 
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within the community and placate the interest of Dochakuha people, the consul 
frequently nominated and appointed a Dochakuha man as the Chairman of the JRA 
board. At the time of 1922，for example, Suzuki Shigetaka (鈐木重孝)，a journalist, 
served in this position. Another more famous figure in this position, Kawabata Teiji (、河 
端貞次 ) ’ who was killed by a Korean terrorist bomb in April 1932 at a ceremony 
honoring Emperor Hirohito's Birthday, was a doctor who had been living in Hongkou 
district for nearly twenty y e a r s . B o t h of them were by no means Dochakuha 
professionals. 
During the late 1920s, the competition of the two groups of Japanese people became 
more intense, because within the "Company Faction" emerged other sub-groupings 
shaped by the relative strength of the textile companies who formed "Boshokuha"(紡織 
派）or the “Textile Faction’，. i66 According to the results of the first and third time major 
elections of the sixty councilors of the JRA, regardless of the question that whether we 
consider the "Company Faction" as a single entity or divided groups, the "Native 
Faction" had gained more seats inside the Residents' Council of the JRA in 1929 than in 
1925: (See Table 12) 
Table 12 
The Election Result of the Residents' Council of the JRA (1925, 1929) 
Kaishaha Dochakuha Boshokuha Neutrality 
First Election 
40 13 7 
(1925) 
Third Election 
10 21 22 7 
(1929) 
Source: Shanhai Shupd (Shanghai weekly), March 18，1929, “Special issue of the 
Residents' Council，，. 
As Joshua A. Fogel argues, this group Japanese expatriates, who had formed an 
economically weak group inside the Japanese community, was "more dependent on 
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local political and economic vagaries".'^^ And it was them, but not the Kaishaha, who 
represented the image of the Japanese civilians' lives in Shanghai. However, because of 
the lack of sources, this group of people does not seem to have left an explicitly visible 
legacy’ though they should be the leading roles in the stories of the Japanese community 
in Shanghai. 
A society formed by small traders 
Unlike those sojourning Japanese businessmen who were often had no choice but 
simply got their marching orders to leave Japan towards Shanghai, the large amount of 
small Japanese traders, other middle-class professionals and poorer people had decided 
to move to Shanghai all by themselves. Besides all those Japanese females who had 
lived depended on the westerners or the Chinese people, most of the Japanese 
forerunners in the early Meiji era were the poor people who could only had "their 
stomach stuffed in Japan’’.】68 Some of them were attracted by the myth of making a 
quick fortune in China, while other successful businessmen, like Kishita Ginko, 
pioneered the Shanghai market for Japan. From the late Shogunate period, the trading 
connections between Shanghai and Nagasaki, Shanghai and Hakodate (函館）had 
already existed. Early Japanese merchants from Kyushu usually ran the business of 
sundry goods, while the trading between Shanghai and Hokkaido were dominated by 
the marine products, especially the “Konbu’’（昆布)，or the tangle and kelp.'^^ Even 
though in the very beginning, such trading network was mainly developed by Chinese 
overseas, most of them were Cantonese and Fukienese, together with some western 
merchants; it was the Japanese small traders in Shanghai who made the city a collection 
and distributing center for the Japanese goods in China and even in East Asia.'^ ® 
When the navigation routes between Shanghai and Japan were greatly developed 
after the first Sino-Japanese War, the trading network was improved in the meantime. 
According to the statistics, in 1882 there were only twelve Japanese firms in China, 31 
in 1891, and 42 in 1893. However, the number of the companies jumped to 114 in 1898. 
Most of these Japanese enterprises centered in Shanghai where attracted most Japanese 
in China. But at the time the overall Japanese investment was only one million yen, 
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which indicates that the scale of these firms were not very big. Most of these firms 
engaged in the import-export trading of cotton, silk, and coal. From the 
Russo-Japanese War to the First World War period, most main Japanese companies, 
together with a large number of small Japanese commercial firms had entered Shanghai 
market. However, even though there were hundreds of Japanese firms opened in the city, 
they still lost by comparison with those western enterprises.'^^ 
Unlike those large Japanese companies who engaged in comprehensive range of 
businesses from trading, commerce to manufacturing, these small or medium-sized 
Japanese firms usually concentrated in the import-export businesses of consumer 
products. Also unlike some other Japanese firms in Shanghai, such as Toyo Menka (東 
洋綿花)，Nihon Menka (日本綿花)，Toyo Shiga (東洋煙草)，and Dai Nihon Eigyo 
K5shi (大日本塩業公司)，who were the specialized dealers of some certain goods, 
most of the small Japanese traders, were dumping a series of Japanese goods, from 
textile goods and daily necessities to hardware, clocks and watches, in order to make the 
largest possible profits. 
From the rapid increase of the Japanese textile goods export to China in the early 
twentieth century, we may see how fast the Japanese commercial firms developed in 
China. In 1907, the import of Japanese textile goods cost only 628 thousand yen; 
however, it jumped to 6081 thousand yen in 1914，which had increased nearly ten-fold. 
And meanwhile in Shanghai, the percentage of such increase was as high as 69%.'^^ 
The number of the Japanese commercial firms in Shanghai kept increasing through the 
1920s to 1930s. (See Tablel3) 
Table 13 
The New Registered Japanese Commercial Firms in Shanghai (1918-1932) 
(A> The (B) Commercial Firms* (C) Import-Export Firms** 
Number of 
^ Proportion Proportion 
� w Number Number 
Enterprises ( _ (C/B) 
1918 43 39 90.7% 31 79.5% 
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37 19 51.4% 9 47.4% 
• 60 41 68.3% 14 34.1% 
2923 66 54 81.8% 43 79.6% 
2922 83 55 66.3% 34 61.8% 
1923 15 5 33.3% 4 80.0% 
2924 21 11 52.4% 7 63.6% 
扭5 19 14 73.7% 4 28.6% 
1926 13 9 61.5% 3 37.5% 
1927 18 7 77.8% 5 35.7% 
1928 12 4 75.0% 6 66.7% 
1929 9 7 77.8% 1 14.3% 
1930 10 4 40.0% 4 100% 
1931 14 7 50.0% 3 42.9% 
1932 7 6 85.7% 1 16.7% 
* Include all the commercial firms which had also run other businesses, but exclude 
those manufacturing enterprises which also engaged in commercial businesses, and the 
service businesses, such as inns, hotels, and barber shops. 
** Include all kinds of the commercial firms which operated import-export trading 
concurrently. 
See Du Xuncheng, Riben zaijiu Zhongguo de touzi, p. 380. 
The figures listed above were somehow lower than the real number in history simply 
because there were so many industrial enterprises which also took part in the 
commercial activities were excluded from the statistics. However, it still helps outline 
the image of the Japanese commercial expansion in Shanghai. 
By what means did these Japanese trading firms survive the tough competition in 
Shanghai? First, the price of the Japanese goods was lower than that of Euro-American 
goods. Take the white twills for instance, the price for the British-American twills were 
9 taels per roll, while the Japanese ones only cost 6.5 taels]?* The relatively lower 
prices of the Japanese goods were welcome by the large grass-root level inside this 
cosmopolitan city, though most of the Japanese consumer products were of poorer 
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external appearance i f competed on quality. Secondly, compare to those western 
countries, Japan lies in a closer distance to Shanghai, thus, the sea-freight was cheaper. 
Based on such an advantage, the Japanese traders could have their goods shipped faster 
to Shanghai and guaranteed the replenishment of goods could be accomplished with 
safety and efficiency. Also this helped them keep the price of their goods lower than that 
of other western countries. Thirdly, the management patterns of Japanese trading firms 
were applied more successfully. They changed tactics when the demand of the market 
shifted and utilized various strategies in order to promote their sales. Besides, both of 
the Japanese government and other Japanese commercial organizations (no matter 
established in Japan or in Shanghai) had emphasized a lot on the information collecting, 
in which included a large amount of the commercial information.'^^ This helped them 
take better control of their businesses and survive in the competitions. Lastly, their close 
relationship with the certain Chinese trading firms in Shanghai made it possible to sail 
the Japanese products directly to the Shanghai market. The merchants from Osaka, for 
example, had established special close ties with those so-called "Toyo So"(“東洋莊"， 
specialty stores for Japanese goods) in Shanghai. Such Chinese firms developed quickly 
because o f the favorable patterns provided by their Japanese suppliers. Also，through the 
commercial network in East Asia, which was established by the Japanese import-export 
merchants in China and Korea together with the overseas Chinese businessmen in Japan 
(most of who settled in Osaka and Nagasaki), the Japanese traders had maintained and 
furthered their businesses from Shanghai towards other Chinese treaty ports and Korean 
cities.丨 76 
In addition to these Japanese trading firms who survived in the regional 
commercial market, there were certain groups of Japanese small traders, middle class 
professionals and other small businessmen who engaged in special service industries. 
Most of them lived upon their own community in Shanghai. It was them who supplied 
their offshore nationals the daily necessities from homeland and provided them with 
other services they needed during their daily lives. Other middle-class professionals, 
such as doctors, teachers, lawyers, journalists and freelancers performed as specialists 
for their communal lives, and often took active roles in the civic and political 
associations. It wi l l not exaggerate too much i f someone argues that these various 
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peoples combined together and formed the core of the Japanese community. Thus, 
besides the limited relations established with their commercial partners, the Japanese 
civilians seldom had any further contacts with Chinese populations in the city. Christian 
Henriot argues that such a Japanese society formed by these peoples was so 
self-contained that it was unnecessary for most of these Japanese civilians to contact 
with other nationals in their daily lives in Shanghai . 口？ Their routinized daily-lives had 
been secured not only by the administrative system maintained by their Consul and the 
JRA, but also by their special "kingdom" erected in the Hongkou district. 
Make Hongkou a Japan town 
Even as late as the early 1930s, the proportion of the Japanese population in 
Shanghai was still very small in comparison to nearly 300 million Chinese populations, 
though at the time the Japanese nationals had outnumbered 25 thousand and was the 
largest foreign community. Like other foreigners in Shanghai, it was impossible for the 
Japanese to live exclusively from their Chinese neighbors even inside the Hongkou 
district where the so-called "Japanese Concession" located.However, we cannot 
deny that it was the Hongkou district where contained a large proportion of Japanese 
populations in Shanghai, which mostly consisted of the Japanese small traders, the 
ordinary employees of the Japanese firms, the inn-keepers, store-owners, restaurant 
runners, middle-class professionals together with the poorer unemployed persons. And 
it was the Hongkou district in which the so-called "Japanese Streets" and "Little Japan" 
appeared. Even today, many Shanghai people still have the impression that had been a 
Japanese concession in Hongkou district during the modem times, just like the British, 
American and French concession areas in the city」79 How did this district develop into 
a Japanese kingdom? What were the Japanese lives like inside this district and in 
Shanghai? 
"Japanese Streets'' & "Little Tokyo" 
When the students graduated from Toa Dobun Shoin!肌 recalled their lives in 
68 
Shanghai, one of the most impressive things was the joyful weekends spent in Hongkou 
district, where the Japanese restaurants, cinemas, teahouses gathered in several main 
streets: 
"In the Hongkou district, the Japanese stores were crowded on Wusong Road, 
Zhapu Road, Boone Road, and Haining Road: the Sukiyaki Restaurants called 
Yasuda (安田),Matsuba (松葉);the noodle house called Mitake (三竹);the Japanese 
cinema Tonwakan (東和館)；Zenzai shop called Tamai (田每）...Gathering in the 
Sukiyaki Restaurant cost one dollar, while the meal at Mitake cost fifty cents.... 
Before the Shanghai Incident, there were many small shops similar to the teahouses 
(in Japan) where you could have a drink like coffee." 
For these students, Hongkou was so "charming" a place where featured familiar 
Japanese restaurants, teahouses, and cinemas, while a wealth of recreational choices 
could be found there. Despite the long distance between their Shoin and Hongkou, these 
students would still like to indulge in Hongkou until the last minute when they had to go 
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back to school before 11 pm. 
As we discussed in Chapter Two, Hongkou was a hinterland crisscrossed by 
waterways, bridges, and streets. Even though Japanese had not evacuated the large 
amount o f the Chinese and monopolized these main streets in Hongkou before the 
second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), it is believed that the so-called "Japanese streets" 
had already existed in Hongkou even as early as 
After the first Sino-Japanese War, Broadway Road had become the center of 
Japanese small businesses. In 1904，many Japanese sundry stores appeared on this street 
which left an impression that a prosperous "Japanese street" emerged, and these 
Japanese businesses developed s t e a d i l y ] 84 According to the investigation conducted by 
the Japanese consulate in 1915, several streets around the Broadway Road in the "outer 
Hongkou area，’ attracted more Japanese residents than any other places, where 
contained more than 16% Japanese population in Shanghai: (See Table 14) 
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Table 14 
The Japanese population resided in Outer Hongkou Area 
Boone Road WusongRoad Kunshan Road Nanxun Road 
Japanese 
851 515 295 235 
Residents 
Source: Yonezawa Hideo, Shanhai Shiwa, p. 207. 
In the 1920s, several crossed roads, around which erected the buildings of the Japanese 
consulate, Higashi Honganji, Japanese club, and etc., were also filled up with Japanese 
residents. 
Take the Wusong Road for instance: This road used to be one of the two main 
streets in Hongkou district which was built in 1856. When the first group of Japanese 
entered Hongkou during the early Meiji era, the region around this road was still farms, 
except for the already-existed Boone Road and Broadway Road. However, during the 
1920s，the areas around were crowded with the Japanese residents and other facilities 
related to their community. According to consulate's statistics in 1927，there were 1997 
Japanese families lived around Wusong Road, which contained nearly thirty percent of 
their populations in Shanghai. This area had been called as "Japanese Streets，，since so 
many Japanese stores were opened here. As the main street in Hongkou area, some 
famous long-standing Japanese shops, such as Tsuchibashigo (土橋号)’ Matsumoto 
Honten (松本本店)，Iwasaki Gofuku Shop (岩崎吳服店)，Nihondo Book Store (曰本堂 
書店)，even had started their businesses during the late Meiji e r a �85 According to the 
"Shanhai Hojin Eigyobetsu"(“上海邦人營業別”，"The Directory of Japanese 
Businesses in Shanghai”）in the 1924 year's Shanhai Arniai’ (上海案内，The Shanghai 
Guidebook), there were 146 Japanese enterprises located on Wusong Road, while most 
of them were Japanese small stores relating to all kinds of businesses from groceries, 
drugs, fish, meat, dry goods, bakeries and candy, to antiques, hardware, upholstery, 
furniture, book stores, clothing, gifts, jewelry, leather goods, shoes and toys. Another 
important road in Hongkou district was North Sichuan Road (or North Szechuan Road) 
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which extended the Japanese presence to the so-called "external roads area". From the 
same "Directory", we may find that North Sichuan Road not only became crowded with 
Japanese shops twenty years after this road had been built, but also attracted even more 
Japanese industrial and commercial entities than the Wusong Road/86 
Besides these two main north-south roads situated “north of the creek’，，some 
other parallel streets (such as Zhapu Road, Miller Road, Nanxun Road and Fearon 
Road), together with some adjacent vertical west-east roads (such as the Range Road, 
Haining Road, Boone Road, Hambury Road, Wuchang Road, Tiantong Road, Seward 
Road and Broadway Road) constructed a special Japanese residential zone in 
Shanghai. 187 
When more Japanese nationals moved to Shanghai after the establishment of the 
new navigation route in 1923, the Japanese community expanded. Consequently, their 
residential area, though still concentrated in the “outer Hongkou", furthered towards the 
middle or even inner Hongkou, and towards the east bank of Hongkou creek or even 
entered Yangshupu district. Thus, when more Japanese resided in different parts of 
Hongkou, Dixwel l Road, and Wuchang Road were regarded the "Japanese Streets" by 
the local Shanghai people, while Japanese residential nationals themselves called the 
Broadway Road "Litt le Tokyo".'^^ 
Japanese lives in Hongkou 
It is difficult to reconstruct the image of Japanese daily lives in Shanghai because 
of the lack o f sources. Even though Japanese community was spread throughout 
Shanghai, they rarely became attracted people's attention unless "the imperial army 
fought in the city or when an anti-Japanese boycott campaign choked everyday life". 
While they became the largest component of the foreigners' society in Shanghai, as 
foreigners and non-Euro-American, they were doubly excluded by the Chinese and 
those Western Shanghailanders. How did they fit in the new "home" when they arrived 
in their new environment? 
For most of the Dochakuha Japanese it was their first taste of life outside Japan, 
though they enjoyed advantages such as the relatively short distance between Japan and 
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Shanghai, the familiar Kanbun (literary Chinese) which they could read. From the 
limited materials we gain the impression that most ordinary Japanese were living inside 
their own insulate community, where they lived, worked, ate and played. For example, 
they could find whatever they need for their daily lives, since most of the Japanese 
small businesses related to their daily lives were opened within the area of the so-called 
"Japanese streets”. (See Table 15) 
Table 15 









Footwear Stores 8 1 89% 
Meat Stores 6 0 100% 
Sake and Beer Stores 13 1 93% 
Clock Stores 9 2 82% 
Restaurants 
(including shops 
50 16 76% 
provided food and 
drink) 
Inns & Lodging Houses 26 8 76% 
Clothing Stores 
(including both 
45 7 87% 
Japanese and western 
style) 
Candy Stores 22 6 79% 
Book Stores 5 0 100% 
Antique Shops 21 1 95% 
Food Stores 30 2 ^ 
Source: "Shanhai Hojin Eigyobetsu", in Shanhai annai (Shanghai, 1924)，pp. 1-39. 
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In the Hongkou market, housewives could buy fish, vegetables and fruits from Japan,‘卯 
while other consumer products could be found inside their residential areas. Besides, 
they could send their children to Japanese schools run by the JRA, see the Japanese 
doctors when they were il l, and have meals in the Japanese style restaurants. During the 
leisure time, the Hongkou Park was the best choice for the Japanese lived nearby. Some 
Japanese golfers even frequented this park to play the golf during the weekends. 
They had little contact with both Chinese and Westerner since it was not necessary, 
though most of them had Chinese neighbors and even neighbors of other nationals. 
Some of them managed to find their place and establish themselves by joining their own 
neighborhood organizations, the Japanese clubs, and other organizations inside their 
community, while the majority would attend the activities held by the Japanese 
consulate and the Japanese religious entities (no matter the Buddhist temple or the 
Japanese Jinsha). Most Japanese people celebrated the festivals and important dates of 
their own country, through which a sense of community had been maintained and 
strengthened. 
However, most Japanese in Shanghai lived a modest life and kept a low profile, 
even though anti-Japanese activity occurred continually in the city. A Chinese scholar 
recalled the his impression of the Japanese people lived in a typical lilong (里弄）or lane 
located on the Dixwell road in Hongkou: 
"In this lane, there were Chinese who migrated to Shanghai from other places in 
China, while Japanese, Indian, Jew, Italian and Filipino people had also resided in 
the same place. There were no conflict between Chinese and foreign residents. 
Even though the national sentiments and anti-Japanese feelings of Chinese people 
were aroused during the Japanese aggression to China, we had not revenged those 
Japanese residents who lived peacefully with us. People lived here showed no bad 
intentions towards those gently polite Japanese females, and their industry and 
thrift children. From the balcony of my living place, I could see the young 
Japanese female embracing their baby sitting on the tatami, and bowing deeply to 
their husbands when they back home from work...— 
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Except for some individual cases, like Uchiyama Kanzo, the small traders from 
Japanese community seldom tried to be involved in the Chinese society, though the 
Chinese merchants supplied them with some usual services. They did not show their 
attitudes towards Chinese people unless the anti-Japanese boycotts deeply affected their 
daily l i v e s . A l s o , unlike those Japanese people from Kaishaha, they did not have 
direct contact with those foreigners from those major powers. Thus, to some extend, 
they lived in a community established by a kind of imagination that they had just lived 
inside a community at home but rather abroad. 
"Nagasaki Ken- Shanhai Shi" 
From the 1920s, Japanese began informally referring to Shanghai as "Nagasaki 
ken, Shanhai shi"(長崎!^-上海市，Nagasaki prefecture, Shanghai City).】94 There are 
several cursory remarks in Japanese indicates the close relation between the two places, 
such as "one can address a letter as 'Nagasaki ken, Shanhai shi' for posting"; "while the 
first-time meeting was at a dinner in Nagasaki, the second may be at a horse race in 
Shanghai." How did such relation establish during the second decade of twentieth 
century? How did such a feeling of linkage emerge among these “Shanghai Japanese"? 
What kind of meaning does this symptom indicate? 
New navigation route between Shanghai and Nagasaki shorten the distance 
between the two cities and started a new era for the Japanese community in Shanghai. 
Before this twenty-seven-hour fast navigation route was established in 1923, it would 
take you seven days to navigate form Tokyo to Shanghai, or five to six days from Kobe 
(字申戶 ) . A f t e r years of discussion, waiting and preparation, two clippers, "Nagasaki 
Maru，，（長崎九）and "Shanhai Maru"(上海九)，started this new route on February 11， 
1923:195 While the “Nagasaki Mam” sailed further to Kobe, the "Shanhai Maru" also 
connected Osaka. Consequently, the travel between China and Japan became more 
convenient, which also greatly influenced the daily lives of Japanese community in 
Shanghai. 
For this extremely self-contained community, the new route strengthened their 
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tendency ofkeepping everything in the same way as it at home. Most Japanese residents 
in Shanghai had maintained their lives in Japanese style. One of the prominent 
evidences is what they ate in Shanghai. During the 1920s, fish and vegetables arrived 
from Nagasaki on a daily basis and were sold in the "Hongkou triangle market"(虹口 
三角市場).Various Japanese stores, such as fish stores, vegetable stores, dry goods 
stores, Japanese cake stores, lined up several streets which all displayed Japanese foods. 
People seek security in the familiar food from home, possibly even what you never 
particularly enjoyed, may become a focus, maybe an obsession. "It was as i f a comer of 
the Nagasaki market had moved,，，noted one Shanghai Japanese from Nagasaki. People 
discovered that "Japanese residents in Shanghai lived there oblivious to the fact that 
they were in foreign country."'^^ 
Most early arrivals in Shanghai were single (most were young and leaving home 
for the first time), even those married seldom accompanied by their family. Dozens of 
inns and lodging houses provided them with accommodation, while small traders and 
their employees might just sleep in their workplace overnight. However, when new 
route was opened between Japan and Shanghai, more and more Japanese came in family. 
Most of these people rented houses in Hongkou district and commuted to work 
e v e r y d a y . 197 The family lives provided Japanese residents a feeling of home. The 
surrounded Japanese enterprises, such as the post offices, temples, public schools, even 
the cemeteries, formed a whole atmosphere that all the Japanese in the city were 
integrated with each other. The maintenance of the Japanese customs, rituals, and even 
the festival celebration and some special ceremonies helped them tie themselves to their 
home. 
As Joshua A. Fogel argued, "the most remarkable quality of the entire Japanese 
enterprise in Shanghai was how extrinsic it was to the city itself and how much life was 
fashioned to resemble home.’"^ When the Japanese community of Shanghai became a 
distinct ethnic enclave and the communal tensions between Chinese and Japanese 
turned into increasingly bitter conflicts, the Japanese in Shanghai nonetheless came to 
represent an economic entity which worth dying to protect. 
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PART THREE 
COMPROMISES AND CONFLICTS 
THIS PART examines 1) the relationship between the Japanese community and the 
authority o f the International Settlement, and 2) the Sino-Japanese tension in Shanghai 
through the early twentieth century. Inside the Settlement, Japanese had enjoyed lower 
status and got less voice than their western counterparts. The representatives of the 
Japanese community had struggled to improve their situation inside though received 
little respect from the west. Meanwhile, anti-Japanese sentiment in China and organized 
actions against Japan, especially the anti-Japanese boycotts, ebbed and flew through the 
period of 1915-1931, which deeply influenced the relationship between the Japanese 
and Chinese communities in the city. The growing Sino-Japanese tension in the city 
reached its exploding point in 1932 when Japanese military force suddenly attacked the 
Zhapei section o f Shanghai. 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONFLICTS WITH COMPROMISES 
Japanese Community and the Shanghai Municipal Council 
The SMC of the International Settlement, as we discussed before, was responsible 
only to its ratepayers who had turned it into "an autonomous body" in Shanghai. Even 
though it had been dominated by the British power in the city, it was "mostly left to its 
own devices by the British government and its diplomatic and consular 
representatives，，. 199 Every foreign community, in principle, was able to take part in its 
administration, such as having representatives in the Council, joining the Volunteer Corps 
and the Municipal Police, i f they were the land renters and rate payers. Personnel who had 
joined the Council's services, such as the engineers, accountants, teachers, health workers 
and policemen, were also coming from different countries, most of whom became the 
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members of the foreign communities in Shanghai. However, for Japanese community, 
they had less voice than those major western powers in the management of the 
International Settlement before the 1930s when their advances in China put pressures on 
the western, mostly British, powers in Shanghai. 
Representatives in Council 
The SMC's early communication with Japanese power in the International 
Settlement was maintained by their occasional correspondences with Japanese Consul 
in the city. And besides a few issues related to the court procedures, there were no 
serious disputes between Japanese and the SMC even without any Japanese 
representative in the SMC before the end of 1915. 
The first Japanese councilor, Ishii Akira (石井徹)，entered the SMC after another 
western member's early resignation. Ishii, the branch manager of N.Y.K. in Shanghai, 
was a Japanese Kanshaha who had also served as the Chairman of the JRA in the 
Japanese community and had close relation with the Japanese Consul. He was the 
candidate for the former years' SMC election but failed to win the post, thus, some 
western councilors questioned this appointment though some other members had 
pointed out that “such appointment would undoubtedly gratify the Japanese 
Government and community and facilitate matters relating to the Settlement which 
involve reference to the Diplomatic When the make-up of the Council was 
revised, a steady national quota (5 British, 5 Chinese, 2 US, and 2 Japanese) had been 
long maintained since the 1920s and had not been challenged by the Japanese power 
before the mid-1930s when the JRA "breached the convention that only two Japanese 
candidates would stand for election to the SMC”.201 
As we discussed before, most of Japanese councilors came from the Kaishaha, 
because of their better language ability and prominent status within the Japanese 
community. Even though this does not mean that they did not pay attention to the 
ordinary communal lives of their community, yet from the archives of the SMC, we may 
find that in this administrative body of foreign communities they actually served as the 
liaison officers between their Consulate and the authorities of the International 
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Settlement rather than the representatives of the Japanese community in Shanghai. 
However, when the Japanese community prospered in the north bank of the 
Suzhou Creek during the First World War period, the Japanese community became more 
involved in the daily affairs in the International Settlement, and the Japanese nationals, 
mostly those from elite class, wanted to participate more in the center of the municipal 
council and took part in the making of the decisions which affected their own 
communities in Shanghai. 
Japanese participation in the SMP and other services in the SMC 
The SMP (Shanghai Municipal Police) force was founded in 1854, and policed the 
International Settlement in Shanghai until 1943. Originally composed of Britons, by the 
time of its incorporation into the puppet police force of the Shanghai municipality it 
consisted of Britons, British Indians, White Russian refugees. Central European Jewish 
refugees, Japanese and of course Chinese, who made up the bulk of the force throughout 
the twentieth century. The Japanese Branch of the SMP was formed in 1916 when 30 
men were recruited from the Tokyo Metropolitan force and there were about 260 
Japanese men in the force by 1938.^ °^ During the turn of the 1920s, when the tension 
between Chinese and Japanese communities rose, one of the disputes focused on the 
Japanese presence in Shanghai was the Japanese consistent demands for an exclusive 
policing force in the Hongkou district, since most of Japanese community's interest 
concentrated there. 
As early as 1918，after the so-called "Hongkew Disturbances" or "Hongkew 
Riots，，(during which two Japanese, one SMP constable and the other a shopkeeper, 
were killed, while the Japanese residents attacked and fought Chinese SMP 
constables)，203 the Japanese community held a meeting at the Japanese club and 
resolved several demands. Among all the demands they proposed, two were related to 
the Japanese branch of the SMP: they insisted that "the number of Japanese police 
should be increased, that the Chinese police should be disarmed in the Settlement" and 
“an additional Japanese police carried with it a recommendation that the unit had its 
own station directly in charge of the Japanese Inspector，’.204 However, the SMC largely 
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held the Japanese community for blame, and noted, worryingly, that the Japanese 
consular authorities appeared to have little control over their community and rejected 
their demand.^ ®^ And despite the fact that the Japanese branch of the SMP was finally 
brought up to 50 in 1920,^°^ the SMC rejected Japanese demand for greater Japanese 
executive control in the force. 
While the national tension between Japan and China became more violent along 
with the triumph of the nationalist revolution in China, the Japanese community in 
Shanghai proposed similar demands to the SMC in the late 1920s. However, such 
demands were again rejected by the SMP and SMC though a Japanese Assistant 
Commissioner of the police force was appointed.^ ®^ In the January of 1928，while the 
Japanese members in the SMC proposed that "the policing of the Dixwell and Pootoo 
Road (Putuo Road,普陀路）districts should be exclusively undertaken by the Japanese 
Branch", the Commissioner of the SMP refused their demand by insisting that "a 
number of Chinese police should be retained in these districts." In another 
circumstance, Japanese demand of "the placing of a Japanese officer in charge of a 
district，，was opposed because of “the difficulty of finding properly qualified men," 
while the SMP intimated that they had "a concurrence in desirability of having Japanese 
officers in responsible positions in certain areas where there are large Japanese 
interests.”209 And in the end of the same year, additional police were hired from Japan 
when the SMP were taking steps to recruit 34 more Japanese constables for the Japanese 
Branch.2i° 
In the late 1920s it was reasonable to for the SMC to avoid arousing further 
conflicts between Japanese and Chinese communities by rejecting Japanese demands for 
their exclusive policing forces in Hongkou, but for Japanese community this was by no 
mean a disappointment. Even though the Japanese members finally accepted such 
excuses as the difficulties in the recruitment procedure, they argued that such difficulty 
was caused by the relatively low pay of the Japanese Branch, which was not 
"commensurate with the responsibility attaching to it (the post), or sufficient to attract 
the services o f property educated and capable man，？" 
Here, the payment of the Japanese personnel in the SMC was another main dispute 
between the Japanese community and the authority of the International Settlement for a 
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long time. 
Japanese personnel, in addition to the Japanese police in the SMP, served in 
different positions in the services of the SMC. However, before the late 1920s, most of 
these positions were low rank and need no special skills, such as the park keepers, meter 
inspectors, nurses, and etc. The pay to these people was comparatively low than those 
western personnel, most of whom served in higher positions. While the JRA had 
subsidized their nationals worked under the SMC,^'^ the Japanese community 
complained such "discrimination" and demanded for the same standard of pay as other 
foreign municipal employees in the SMC service. In 1928，for example, when the 
Japanese councilor, Mr. Fukushima (福島)expressed the appreciation of the Japanese 
community for the SMC，s decision that the two Japanese employees, like other 
employees in the Electricity Department, would be paid at the rate of taels, he argued 
that the Council ought give up the system of differed pay for Asiatic employees and 
other distinctions in the terms of service and follow the practice of the Chinese 
Maritime Customs and the Post Office，in which the Japanese employees were accorded 
the same treatment as other foreign employees. Another instance was in 1931 when 
both of a Chinese and Japanese were nominated respectively for a Chinese and a 
Japanese Assistant Secretary in the press office of the SMC,^ '"^ the question whether the 
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Japanese Press officer should receive a Class ‘A，or a Class ‘L，letter of Appointment 
and whether they should receive equivalent rates of pay had arisen. The Japanese 
member of Council insisted that Japanese nationals enjoyed "in the same position as 
other foreign municipal employees", thus should receive the Class ‘A’ letter of 
appointment and received a higher pay than his Chinese colleague, owing to the fact 
that they are not permanently domiciled in Shanghai." However, the Council insisted 
the same rate of pay for Japanese and Chinese press officials in order to avoid the "a 
feeling of dissatisfaction on the part of the Chinese press nominee."^'^ 
Even though we cannot simply argue that it was the SMC's long-persisted 
"policy" to isolate the Japanese from the decision making group in the SMC or exclude 
them from their British-American intelligence unit, for those Japanese officers who had 
worked in the SMC services, they still had gained a strong feeling that they had got little 
respect from their western colleagues and received unfair differentiation rates of pay.^'^ 
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While most of the "Dochakuha" Japanese resented the predominant status of the British, 
similar dissatisfaction was also held by the elite class Japanese and even their 
diplomatic officers in Shanghai.^^^ 
Japanese wanted more voice in the SMC 
As we have just discussed, during the 1920s, Japanese community had got little 
dominance in the administration of the International Settlement since the British 
dominated the important positions of the SMC. However, during the late 1920s, 
Japanese community began to urge more Japanese voice in the SMC because they were 
"dissatisfied with certain aspects of the Municipal administration of the Settlement."^ 
In the November of 1927，a series of Japanese petitions were received by the SMC. 
This time the local Japanese residents demanded not only the increase of the Japanese 
Branch of the Police Force, but also the engagement of Japanese nationals in other 
Departments of the Council's service, the translation of the Council's official documents 
into the Japanese language, and etc. The Chairman of the SMC met the representations 
who had made to him by prominent local Japanese subjects. They transmitted the strong 
feeling of the Japanese community that the Council "should meet them in the matter of 
the petitions put forward", i f it "desires to ensure the co-operation of the Japanese 
community in the interests of the good government of the Settlement." The reasons put 
forward by the Japanese community for compliance with their request included: 1) the 
Japanese population was almost three times as large as that of any other foreign 
nationality in the International Settlement; and 2) approximately two fifths of the 
General Municipal Rate was paid by Japanese residents; 3) there were a large present 
and potential business interests of the Japanese in Shanghai. These arguments sounded 
so unyielding that the Chairman had admitted that “it was necessary to recognize that 
the time had arrived when the Japanese Community should be given greater opportunity 
for employment in the Municipal Service” and promised that their proposals would be 
"given the most sympathetic consideration，，，though meanwhile he maintained "it would 
be not equitable to dismiss present members of the staff in order to create vacancies.，，22° 
Two weeks later, proposals had been put forward that 89 Japanese employees 
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would be engaged by the various departments in the SMC during 1928: out of these 89 
positions 73 were posts which have definitely created in order that they might be filled 
by Japanese subjects. The Chairman also expressed the hope that as suitable vacancies 
occurred in the various Departments of the Service due consideration would be given to 
qualifications o f Japanese residents to f i l l such posts.^^' 
After this "triumph" the Japanese community had one more Japanese Assistant 
Commissioner o f Police in 1928，and an Assistant Secretary in Press office. According 
to the recording o f Gaimusho, at the end of 1930，there were 216 Japanese personnel 
working in the SMC, while this number increased to 240 before the Shanghai Incident 
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in 1932. Even though a more violent electoral struggle occurred repeatedly in 1936， 
1938 and 1939，the Japanese had gained more voices in the SMC in the early 1930s than 
ever before, and tried to change their once marginalized status among the western 
communities in Shanghai. 
The anti-Japanese boycotts and Japanese community 
During the period of 1915-1931, the boycott — a mode of passive resistance to 
which Chinese people had gained recourse as a means of opposing action when they 
considered unjust on the part of their own authorities - had in various instances been 
employed against the trade of one or another foreign nation as a weapon by which to 
enforce form their redress for what they deemed to be grievances?^ Even though there 
were boycotts against trade of various "imperialists", such as the anti-American boycott 
in 1905-1906，the anti-British boycott in 1925-1926, and etc., the anti-Japanese boycotts 
happened more frequently than any boycotts against foreign powers in China. 
Moreover, because of the concentration in Shanghai of Japanese and Japanese interests, 
it had always been the center of such resistant campaigns, especially in the large scale of 
anti-Japanese boycotts took place in 1915, 1919-1920, 1925-1926，1927-1929, and 1931. 
Nevertheless, even the anti-Japanese boycotts varied by the year. The frictions between 
the Japanese and Chinese communities caused and heightened by the anti-Japanese 
boycotts were also changing from time to time. 
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The boycott as an economic tool 
In 1915 when the landing of Japanese troops in Shandong caused Sino-Japanese 
difficulties, an anti-Japanese boycott was produced by the so-called "Twenty-one 
Demands.” With the establishment of the “Society to Propagate the Use of National 
Goods"(勸用國貨會）and the initiation of the "National Salvation Fund Movement" 
(救國儲金運動)，the 1915 boycott took on quite largely the form of a movement to 
"buy Chinese goods.，，^ ^^  As to the economic effectiveness of boycott in 1915, Charles 
F. Remer argued that: 
"The boycott of 1915 was the first which revealed the power of this weapon in the 
hands of the Chinese. The decline in Japanese trade was great for the brief period of 
severest boycotting. This decline was not confined to a single part of China as had 
been the case during earlier boycotts ... The stimulus to domestic industry from 
boycotting had added a new feature but otherwise this boycott was not different, 
except in extent, from those of an earlier day."^ ^^  
However, the Japanese import-export businesses suffered a lot during this boycott. The 
Japanese coal had been steadily replaced by the coal form Kailuan (開灤）and were 
nearly driven out of the Shanghai market.^^^ The market price of the cotton products 
from Japan declined gradually when the calling for the total resisting of Japanese 
products rose in Shanghai and Tianjin.^^^ Not only these Japanese import-export trades, 
the large Japanese navigation companies^ the sundry goods shops and cotton mills 
run by Japanese had also been deeply affected by this boycott. ^ ^^  Under such 
circumstances, most Japanese firms in Shanghai had no business at all: Uchiyama 
Kanzo, for example, who was working as salesmen for a Japanese drugstore in the city, 
had nothing to do all the days but kept discussing the current developments of the 
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anti-Japanese boycotts with his Japanese colleagues. 
In 1919，a more general anti-Japanese boycott erupted with student's leadership 
among merchants and the lower middle class. This time the immediate cause was the 
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receipt o f the news in China that the Peace Conference in Paris announced their 
intention of awarding Japan the former German leasehold of Shandong province. As the 
only weapon available to Chinese to fight their "selfish and aggressive neighbor", they, 
again，"resorted to wit a boycott of everything belonging to Japan.^ ^^ As summarized 
by Remer, boycott of this time was better-organized: the students, the consumers, the 
Chamber of Commerce had been tightly unified, when the boycott had also associated 
with a general popular movement happened in early June. 233 Compared with the 
boycott o f 1915，this time the boycott was undertaken in a more systematic way: Rules 
o f boycott was first clarified by the promotersStudents form all over the country 
gathered in Shanghai and served as enthusiastic propagandists; merchants together with 
different guilds were adopting action for boycott against Japanese trading interests. It 
was recorded that in the end of May there were an increasing number of Chinese people 
queuing outside the Japanese banks for exchanging their paper for silver dollars, since 
the boycotters yelled for “not to accept or honor any Japanese bank-notes." Meanwhile, 
special funds were created for “the purpose of paying the Chinese servants of Japanese 
who were expected to leave their employment”.23^ The Japanese community, on the one 
hand, vaunted “the preparedness of the Japanese banks and other firms to stand against 
even a prolonged boycott” and pointed out "the futility of such movements in former 
times，，;236 on the other hand, their trade was badly hit by this deep-rooted movement 
which waged intermittently from May of 1919 through 1920 and 1921.^^^ Some 
Japanese traders erased the trade mark ‘made in Japan' since most Chinese merchants 
refused to deal in Japanese goods. The cotton importation from Japan decreased; 
even the Japanese shipping firms were affected by the boycott due to the Chinese 
refusal to transport cargoes on Japanese ships.^^^ 
When a wave of national sentiment rose in Shanghai during the 1920s in reaction 
to the foreign powers in the city, anti-foreign boycotts happened more often than earlier 
decades. A Chinese Mass meeting was held in the June of 1927, when some strict 
anti-Japanese resolutions were a d o p t e d . I n the mid-1920s, the Chinese importation of 
Japanese cotton decreased sharply. During the April of 1927，definite signs of panic had 
begun to spread through the Shanghai Japanese Community owing to the closing of two 
local Japanese banks, following a steady drain upon resources of each, when depositors 
began withdrawing their deposits.】"" However, affected by the mood on the third 
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anniversary o f the May Thirtieth Movement, the most economically effective 
anti-Japanese boycott erupted in 1928，as a protest against the “Jinan Incident" (or 
“Tsinan Incident，，)，and lasted through 1929. This time, the Japanese traders suffered 
even heavier financial loss than in those former boycotts.242 Even though the boycott of 
Japanese goods was still the only weapon, it became more rigorous this time.^^^ In 1928’ 
a centralized Anti-Japanese Association was organized who checked the transactions in 
Japanese goods.^'^ A National Anti-Japanese Conference held in Shanghai on July 
21-27, which adopted a series of resolutions and certain rules of procedure which were 
to serve as the basis for all of the anti-Japanese organizations in China.245 According to 
these rules, some common Japanese consume products in Shanghai market, such as 
cotton yam, clocks, sugar, tumblers, umbrellas, and shirts, could be seized in Chinese 
ruled areas which caused many Japanese goods kept in storage in Shanghai after being 
shipped from Japan.^^^ The seized Japanese goods would be held until the importing 
merchants paid a specified fine to the national salvation fund. For example, it was 
reported that during the early part of November C $200,000 worth of salt fish and other 
goods imported from Japan was seized at Nantao and were returned to the importers 
upon the payment of a fine of C $35,000,247 it was estimated that the loss in trade with 
China by Japanese merchants in Shanghai was as high as y. 32,000,000. '^^ ^ 
An anti-Japanese boycott revived after the Wanbaoshan Incident (萬寶山事件） 
in July 1931，which was intensified after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident on 
September 18，1931. An anti-Japanese association, the Anti-Japanese and Protect 
Overseas Association (反日援橋委員會)，was organized by the Shanghai Kuomintang 
when they held a meeting at the Shanghai Chinese General Chamber of Commerce. 
They declared a boycott o f Japanese goods and the permanent severance of economic 
relations with Japan, and called for a nation-wide boycott of Japanese goods.249 This 
time the movement was insisted unanimously in all circles. It was reported that it was 
practically impossible to sell or buy Japanese products in Shanghai.^ ^® The pickets of 
the Anti-Japanese and Protect Overseas Association had seized the Japanese goods at 
the checkpoints in the city, which became the main method during this time's 
boycotting.251 Nearly all the Japanese commodities, such as cotton yam, soap, glass 
bottles, and matches, were confiscated by them. According to the recording of Japanese 
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foreign ministry, up to the end of 1931，more than C $127,000,000 worth of Japanese 
goods had been seized by the Chinese. ^ ^^  The situation of small-scale Japanese 
business in the city was especially bleak because of the severity of the boycott. 
Al l in all, the anti-Japanese boycotts in Shanghai became radical between 1915 
and 1931. The economic effectiveness of the boycotts deeply affected the Japanese 
community in the city and those Japanese businessmen at home. Besides the great loss 
in economy, the agitation and hostility had also emerged between the Japanese and 
Chinese community in the city, which affected the daily lives of the Japanese society in 
Shanghai. 
The hostilities and the Japanese reaction 
While the main panic of the Japanese community was due to the economic 
depression caused by the boycotts, the unfavorable experience in their routine lives also 
provoked their resentment. Whenever an anti-Japanese boycott erupted in the city, 
similar hostilities towards the Japanese presence would appear, such as the distribution 
of anti-Japanese handbills, the organizations of anti-Japanese rallies, and the occurrence 
of strikes as political protests in those Japanese owned businesses.^ "^^  
In response to fears arisen during the boycott, six neighborhood associations (町内 
會，Chonaikai) were first organized for local self-defense and mutual aid. Based on 
these associations the League of Japanese Neighborhood Associations of Shanghai (上 
海曰本人町内會聯合會，Shanhai Nihonjin Chonaikai Rengokai) was formed in 1917. 
The neighborhood associations had risen to forty by the mid-1920s. When the boycotts 
and other anti-Japanese actions erupted, these neighborhood associations were called 
into action to provide Japanese with current information, deliver the mail, distribute 
food, protect fellow nationals (especially schoolchildren). Instead of being led by the 
JRA leaders, such neighborhood associations were organized by the Native Clique, 
though they were affiliated with the JRA.^ ^^ Meanwhile, the vigilance committees (自 
警團，Jikeidan), and the Shanghai Branch of the Imperial Military Reservists' 
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Association (帝國在鄕軍人會，Teikoku zaigo gunjin kai) were organized in order to 
protect local Japanese interests. Most of such organizations (except the Imperial 
Military Reservists' Association, which was organized by a group of local JRA members 
with military experience) represented the majority of the Japanese community in the city, 
who had confronted the Chinese nose-to-nose.^^^ 
However, before 1927 when the city (the Chinese ruled areas) was handed over to 
the Kuomintang government, the conflicts between Japanese and Chinese people 
seemed to be relatively mild. Both the authorities of the foreign settlement and the local 
Chinese government called for the calm of the boycotters and Japanese community. The 
Japanese consul and the Chinese official kept in close touch while the disturbances 
occurred in the city. The police force, no matter belonged to the foreign settlements or to 
the Chinese government, tried their best to preserve the order. Most Japanese nationals 
had kept calm for the sake of the reputation of their community. In 1915, for example, 
besides the news that some "over-enthusiastic citizens" who had gathered in front of the 
Japanese firms and tried to persuade the Chinese not to buy Japanese products, caused 
several lawsuits between Japanese merchants and these Chinese,^ ^^ no really serious 
violence towards Japanese community could be found in the recordings of the 
contemporary local newspapers. One of the most unrestrained affairs was a piece of 
news reporting that the windows of some Japanese firms were broken by angered 
Chinese, while others threw eggs towards the Japanese shops in Hongkou district, 
which caused these Japanese businesses closed up and stopped businesses for several 
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days. Meanwhile, in responding to the abusive languages used by Chinese, Japanese 
posters containing an expression of scorn had also irritated the Chinese people.〕^。 
During the boycott of 1919, as described by the SMP report, few of those energetic 
students gave trouble on the streets except distributing handbills. “No cases of 
intimidation or of incitement by them to disorder came directly under police notice 
within Settlement limits” said the report. The Chinese patriotic students had also 
clarified that they had no grudge or hatred against Japanese people, and no violent act 
would or could occur in their movement.^ ^® The Chinese newspapers reported that the 
foreign owned shops in the Hongkou district kept running during the general strike of 
the local merchants, when the SMP arranged more patrols than usual in the district;^^' 
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while the North China Herald said that “ in Hongkew，，，"there was little of importance to 
report." However, rumors spread in the city during both boycotts of 1915 and 1919. 
While gossips that Japanese navy was going to sending their marine force in order to 
protect their nationals were heard in 1915,^ ^^ in the June of 1919 the rumor of the 
poisoning o f wells and food by Japanese had led to many assaults on some innocent 
Japanese people严 
During the mid-1920, violence between the Chinese working class and Japanese 
cotton mil l owners had increased, while some deaths and injuries of Japanese nationals 
during the combats were reported by the press. The Japanese primary schools closed 
during the climax of the upheavals following the May Thirtieth Incident, when a small 
group of the Japanese naval landing party landed. Violence towards ordinary Japanese 
civilians happened in Hongkou and Yangshupu district caused the sending of Japanese 
branch of the SVC.265 
Nevertheless, situations became even tougher during the late 1920s when the 
Northern Expedition rode the wave of anti-imperialist fervor. From 1927, especially 
after the Jinan incident in 1928，Japan had been singled out by the anti-foreign 
propaganda. Such a trend met its climax in 1931 when new waves of anti-Japanese 
agitation irritated the Japanese community who nearly reached exploding point. Chinese 
people in the city had been "burning in public of all Japanese goods seized by the 
Association，，，and insisted that "the penalty of death should be imposed upon any one 
responsible for the enforcement of the boycott, who is found guilty of receiving 
bribes. ”266 
Although their consul protested the boycotts and other anti-Japanese movements 
towards the Japanese civilians in the city, such protest may not replied by the national 
government. The Japanese argued that “no civilized country wi l l permit its people to 
enforce at their own discretion regulations for the punishment of offenders for the 
purpose of carrying on an anti-Japanese boycott."267 In fact, the Japanese community in 
Shanghai became the scapegoat for their military expansionists, and this may show why 
the Japanese community in Shanghai felt extremely humiliated and became more and 
more irritated and worried about their situation in the city. 
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Conflicts with Compromises 
Although the ordinary Japanese civilians in Shanghai had little chance to enjoy a 
deep relationship with residential communities during the early twentieth century, the 
Japanese community who mainly lived inside Hongkou district of the International 
Settlement still faced with the question that how to get along with their neighbors, 
especially during some period with growing tension between different peoples. Such 
tensions may be aroused by the economic factors, or different status inside the 
treaty-port system，but in modem Shanghai, especially after the 1920s, the nationalist 
sentiment had become the moving force of the interaction of the Sino-foreign 
communities, especially between the Japanese and Chinese communities. 
No matter inside the management institution of the International Settlement or 
within the surroundings of Sino-foreign societies the presence of conflicts could not be 
avoided. While there were disputes inside the SMC between Japanese representatives 
and other western and Chinese councilors, the conflicts occurred more often between 
the Japanese and Chinese communities because of the tension aroused by the 
anti-Japanese movements kept rising and falling through the end of 1910s to the early 
1930s. 
Since the Japanese community had less qualified electorate to vote in election of 
councilors and sit at meeting of ratepayers, they had fewer representatives and enjoyed 
less voice inside the SMC. Thus, Japanese representatives had been compromised to the 
authority o f the western dominance though they felt extremely disappointed in some 
certain cases. For example, in 1928，the SMC refused the permission of a lantern 
procession in this city on November 11，when the Japanese was going to celebrate the 
coronation o f Japanese emperor. While the SMC thought such a procession would be 
"an act of discrimination against the Chinese," this decision had caused great 
disappointment to Japanese.^ ^^ 
As to the Sino-Japanese relations in the city, before the mid-1920s, the 
anti-Japanese tensions hardly made serious conflicts between Japanese and Chinese 
communities, since they kept quiet and calm under the economic attacks. During the 
anti-Japanese movement of 1919，for example, the Japanese community hoped that "the 
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agitation i f unresisted wi l l die a natural death."^^^ The Japanese consuls in the city tried 
their best to pacify their community, while they also demanded the local Chinese 
government and the authorities of the foreign settlements to protect the Japanese 
citizens in the city and suppress the radical activities towards them. Nevertheless, 
atmosphere between the Japanese and Chinese communities deteriorated in the 
mid-1920s, though, as analyzed by Hammi Goto-Shibata, both the Japanese diplomats 
and their elite class in Shanghai were very optimistic of the anti-Japanese boycott.^^^ 
The Japanese consuls and other elites often inclined to solve the problem through 
diplomatic methods. Before the end of 1920s, diplomatic methods, namely the 
governmental negotiations, were still effective: Chinese government would suppress the 
Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts while Japanese put pressures on them. But this does not 
mean that the Japanese did not need to make concessions when the Sino-Japanese 
tension rose. To end the anti-Japanese strikes in 1925, an agreement was made with the 
Chinese when the Japanese promised to increase the wages and improve the living 
condition o f the Chinese workers. 
However, situation changed when the nationalist began to struggle for the 
independence from foreign domination. When the focus of Chinese Nationalists' 
anti-imperial propaganda shifted from Britain in 1927 to Japan in 1928, anti-Japanese 
boycotts and other movements were applied not only as an economic weapon but also 
as a part of the so-called "Revolutionary Diplomacy". Such a shift could be felt even as 
early as 1927 when the North Expedition had driven a large amount of Japanese 
refugees to Shanghai. Some of the Japanese refugees, as reported by the North China 
Herald, had enjoyed such a feeling of the hostility of the Chinese nationalists: 
"The attitude of the Chinese towards Japanese, they say is becoming more and more 
aggressive and hostile and, if this feeling is not checked in good time, it will be 
detrimental to the interests of Japanese residents of China, such interests having 
been built by Japanese merchants as a result of some 60 years hand toil." '^^  
The interests o f Japanese businesses had been regarded as the most important aspect of 
the Japanese presence in China. However, most of such interests were protected by the 
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extraterritorialities in the treaty ports system. Thus, when an anti-imperialist 
revolutionary party (Kuomintang) was going to overthrow the foreign privilege in China, 
the Japanese community gained the feeling that they could no longer make any 
compromises since the Nationalist regime had touched their bottom line.^^^ 
Such a feeling could only be intensified after 1928 through the early 1930s when 
the economic situation became worse. The optimism of Japanese consulate officials and 
elite class could no longer influence their compatriots. The Japanese press accused such 
“riots，，towards Japanese were caused by the chicanery Chinese, whose nationalist 
propaganda invented a story in Jinan which aroused anti-Japanese sentiment, and argued 
that it was the traditional Chinese c h i c a n e r y . 2 7 4 The calling for a stronger stand against 
the Chinese nationalist movement appeared not only in the ordinary Japanese but also in 
the elite dass?^ 
Most of the ordinary Japanese had come to think that their government in home 
country did not understand the real situation of the anti-Japanese boycott in China since 
the diplomats was too optimistic to make sufficient efforts to put an end to the 
boycotts. Thus, the Japanese merchants, no matter the small dealers or the cotton 
mil l owners, just "became very keen on the idea of relying on naval power", and like 
Harumi Goto-Shibata argued, “the more irritated the Japanese businessmen in Shanghai 
became over time, the keener they also became regarding this idea."^^^ 
Thus, when the compromises could no longer guarantee the suppress of the 
anti-Japanese movement and the revive of the Japanese businesses in the city, the 
Japanese community just pleaded for an alternative for a diplomatic response to the 
growing nationalist sentiments among the Chinese, which turned out to be a passive or 
aggressive response, the military force. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SHANGHAI 1932: AN ERA ENDED 
In the end of 1931，the Japanese society in Shanghai was faced with the question 
that how to put the Chinese anti-Japanese movements to an end, not a contemporary 
pause but an ultimate ending. However this time, the diplomats were no longer trusted 
by the Japanese merchants and other small dealers in the city，since they seemed to be 
unconcerned and unhelpful. They inclined to call on the Japanese military force to 
provide protection. 
As pointed out by Donald A. Jordan: 
"The story of the response of Japanese businesses at Shanghai requires an 
examination of civilian industrial associations and overseas organization for 
Japanese nationals in China — seinendan* youth groups, reservist units, and 
Japanese Residents' Associations (JRA) - all of which had links with the Japanese 
army/'278 
Even though the armed conflict happened in early 1932 was not merely caused by the 
depression of Japanese community and the activities of their organizations, most of such 
Japanese overseas organizations and their behaviors in Shanghai were still closely 
related with the conflict happened in the early 1932. 
When the news of Manchurian Incident spread south, Shanghai became the last 
base o f many Japanese in less well-protected cities of China,^^^ because the Japanese 
had never quite removed their military forces from the Hongkou district of the 
International Settlement and guaranteed the relative security of Shanghai. However, in 
1931，an unprecedented level of anxiety grew and spread within the Japanese 
community when various anti-Japanese organizations were formed in the city and their 
activities became radical towards the ordinary Japanese. As described by Christian 
Henriot, Shanghai's Japanese community deeply affected by the boycott not because of 
• Japananese Young Men's Association (青年団,Seinendan) 
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the violence but because of the humiliation they gained. The Chinese not only refused to 
do business with them but also refused to supply them with the usual services (water, 
food，coal, etc.) which made their lives difficult. According to the records of 
Japanese foreign ministry, from the September 19 to the December 31，1931，there were 
581 Japanese students and 623 other Japanese nationals had been "attacked" by the 
Chinese in the city. Some of the “attacks’，as throwing stones and glasses towards them, 
compelling them to get off the buses and tramcars, spitting in their face, and etc., "hurt" 
the Japanese nationals psychologically rather than physically.^^^ 
The anti-Japanese actions hit the Japanese community, especially the Dochakuha 
Japanese in the city. The representatives of these smaller Japanese merchants and 
factory owners, who were in extreme difficulties owing to depression and the boycott, 
called upon the Japanese Consul in the early January of 1932 "to explain the hardships 
which are facing these people’，. Although the Consul promised to give financial 
assistance, these small businessmen seemed to need more safety guarantee.^ ^^ 
Several Residents' Assemblies (居留民大會，Kyoryumin Taikai) were held 
following the Manchurian Incident, during each assembly four to six thousands 
Japanese civilians from fifteen Chinese cities were gathered. During these gatherings 
the calling on the Japanese government and military “to provide aid against Chinese 
efforts to destroy them” appeared more often than ever before. Even though the 
Kaishaha seemed to have more moderate tone, they were also very insisted that, like the 
situation in Manchuria, Shanghai should be protected by their military force in the same 
way. 283 Shigemitsu Mamoru (重光莫)，the contemporary Japanese plenipotentiary in 
China, recalled that he was very surprised and worried about such changes in the 
attitude of the Japanese community in Shanghai - not only the ordinary Japanese folks, 
even branch managers of big Japanese firms, whose thoughts had always been calm and 
mature, held the similar unyielding idea of pleading for the help from military force. ^ 84 
When the demands proposed by the Japanese Consul remained rejected by the 
Nationalist government in Shanghai, the Japanese military force began to take action 
towards Shanghai. While the landing force and the warships of Japanese navy started to 
gather in Shanghai, when more Japanese Renins (浪人）came to Shanghai from other 
Chinese cities in separate lots, more and more tense confrontation between Japanese and 
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Chinese residents were reported by the local press. Besides the activities as tearing 
down the anti-Japanese caricature posters and Chinese flags from shop windows, some 
violence were conducted towards both of the Chinese civilians and Chinese constables 
of the SMP. The increased presence of Japanese marines in Shanghai and the highly 
visible Japanese gunboats steaming on the Huangpu River were also reported by the 
local press, while the disorders caused by Renins, no matter in Hongkou district or in 
the sector of Chinese Zhabei adjacent to International Settlement, happened more often. 
Meanwhile the Japanese community began to "speak loudly" towards the Chinese 
by showing the possibilities of the outrage of their power in Chinese largest city even in 
front of the western presence. 
The municipal authority of International Settlement began to worry that such 
tensions between Chinese and Japanese would damage the neutral position of the 
International Settlement. When the third Japanese Residents' Assembly was held on 
December 6，1931，the SMP had imposed a contemporary curfew around the meeting 
place until the Japanese gathering dispersed in order to prevent unnecessary chaos and 
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skirmishes. A special meeting was held on November 30，1931 by the SMC, during 
which the Chairman of the SMC stated that they would prevented any hostile military 
activities inside the International Settlement, while others insisted that the SMC would 
preserve the lives and property of all residents of the Settlement, irrespective of the 
nationality of such residents.^^^ 
However, result of growth of Japanese power and desire for colonies like other 
great powers plus the increasing dominance of military in Japanese decision-making. In 
Shanghai, an armed conflict was expected by the Japanese community in the late 1931; 
the only problem was when the expected would occur. 
Although Joshua A. Fogel points out that at the time inside the Japanese 
community in Shanghai the class tension was heightened between the Kaishaha and the 
Dochakuha Japanese,^^^ we may find that the Japanese society, when faced with the 
outside pressure, became even more united because of the communal antagonism 
between Japanese and Chinese in Shanghai. The continuing agitation aroused by the 
Japanese Residents' Assemblies organized by the JRA had also influenced specific 
Japanese economic lobbies that had also put pressures on both of the Japanese 
Consulate and the Nationalist government in Shanghai. This time, the Japanese Consul, 
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Murai (村井）was faced with a situation difficult to cope with: On the one hand, the 
Chinese nationalist government seemed to be unyielding and did not reply to the 
Japanese demands proposed by him; On the other hand, the Japanese civilians, no 
matter the small dealers or large merchants became more radical and acted under their 
own way to plead for the help from military force instead of the diplomatic negotiation 
to end the anti-Japanese movements in the city.^^^ 
When one of the assault towards the Japanese monks aroused serious disturbances in 
Shanghai,290 the national spirit of Japanese community was inflamed. Even though the 
International Settlement banned Japanese residents, who were in a violate mood, from 
processing to the funeral, twenty-third thousand of irate Japanese nationals attended the 
temple funeral in Hongkou district of the International Settlement and then the cremation 
at a Japanese cemetery in Zhabei.^^' After the Sanyou Towel Mi l l (三友實業丨社）was 
burnt by the Japanese Renins, the Japanese marine commandant threatened to march his 
marines through the Settlement and shut down a nationalist newspaper, Minguo Ribao (民 
國日幸艮)，who had accused that local Japanese marines colluded in the burning of the 
Sanyou Mill.^^^ As recorded by the North China Herald, Sino-Japanese tensions flared 
following these incidents in Shanghai. Disturbances between Japanese and Chinese could 
not be avoided: 
"In the afternoon about 1000 Japanese met in their club in Boone Road where fiery 
and excited speeches were made, expressing indignation over the attacks on the 
Japanese priests. A resolution was passed calling upon their Government to dispatch 
additional warships and military units to Shanghai for the complete suppression of 
all anti-Japanese movements by 'acting within self-protective limits' as the 
anti-Japanese agitations had reached their zenith. About half those present they 
marched to their consulate-General to present Mr. K. Murai ... On the way, 
Hongkew police officers turned out to act as an escort and in Woosung Road the 
crowd was swelled considerably. In Range Road, a Japanese made a sudden dive at a 
CP.C. but a Japanese constable managed tactfully to restrain him. The crowd turned 
from Range Road into North Szechuan Road when a riot commenced. One report 
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stated that it was started by a brick being thrown through a window but the 
Japanese report was to the effect that a missile was hurled from an upper storey at 
the crowd. At any rate, several bricks were thrown and shop window smashed. The 
police did their best to check the crowd and the Reserve Unit was called out."293 
When Japanese rubbed shoulders with Chinese on so many levels, the war, broke 
out in the predawn hours of January 28，1932. The Japanese forces suddenly attacked 
the Zhapei section of Shanghai, advancing from Hongkou district of the International 
Settlement. It was officially stated that the Japanese forces, which was of 40,000 men 
strong and subsequently increased to about 60,000, had been sent to Shanghai, solely to 
protect her nationals that at no time numbered over 20,000 men, women and children. 
Widespread fighting, which included aerial bombardment of densely populated areas, 
devastated Zhabei and surrounding districts. Thousands of refugees poured into the 
International Settlement. During the thirty-three-day disaster, 6080 Chinese dead, 2000 
wounded, and 10,400 missing; 814,084 persons suffered direct losses, and 80 percent of 
urban workers lost their jobs; 50 percent of all factories in Zhabei were destroyed 
largely from aerial bombardment, and 1.2 million Chinese were made refugees.^ ^"^ 
During the wartime, some of the Japanese nationals who remained in the city had 
also attended to assist their armies under the leadership of some Japanese organizations. 
The JRA, for example, whose role during wartime was very complicated, took several 
responsibilities which included the liaison with government and police agencies, 
making the Japanese position known to the press, providing a temporary postal service, 
turning some of the dormitories at JRA-mn schools over to military use, mobilizing 
teachers at those same schools to work in field hospitals, collecting funds to support the 
various agencies during the crisis, purchasing food and fuel and acquiring vehicles from 
Nagasaki and Dalian, providing houses and provisions for refugees, distributing free 
food, and interpreting for military personnel, and etc.^ ^^ Besides the fact that most of 
the Japanese women and children had withdraw before the war, we have no further 
information related to the Japanese community remained during the disaster. However, 
from the recordings of SMC and contemporary newspapers, we learn that several 
groups o f Japanese civilians in the city served as irregular force in Hongkou district, 
most of who got little control from their authority, or we may argue, the Japanese army 
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just did not want to control their activities inside Hongkou district, since they regarded 
this area as their own concession.^^^ Even though Hongkou remained a status as only 
part of the International Settlement before 1943，it had been turned into a Japanese 
dominant “concession” after, or even during the war in 1932. 
As to the cause of this war, some historians argues that it was caused by the 
diplomatic failure of both Japan and Chinaf? while some other scholar believes that 
the Shanghai Incident "derived partly from planned provocation by Kanto army agents 
trying to distract attention from continuing troop movements in M a n c h u r i a " . 二卯 
However, the large Japanese economic stake in the Shanghai market certainly helps to 
explain the willingness of local Japanese towards the military "protection" in Shanghai. 
The words of a contemporary Japanese travel writer Muramatsu Shofu.(村松梢風）may 
help us better understand their such feelings: 
"The Japanese have no intention whatsoever of throwing away fifty years of work 
that have gone into the building of 'Shanghai-Japan.' Then Yangtze trade runs 
annually to five or six hundred million yen and often more than seven. As 
Manchuria is Japan's lifeline, the Yangtze trade is Japan's line of nourishment, and 
it will under no circumstances dispense with this. There is no reason to relinquish 
such great interests of Shanghai. We cannot let them die before our very eyes. This 
is our responsibility both as a state and as a g o v e r n m e n t / ' ^ ^ ^ 
After the cease-fire, when the Japanese naval landing party was stationed in the 
barracks in Shanghai's ‘little Japan，，the Japanese community in Shanghai was given a 
fi l l ip by their military presence in this Chinese largest treaty Meanwhile, the 
Japanese community in Shanghai entered a new era. 
Before 1932 the Japanese community had been mainly developed based on the 
center o f Consular offices in the city, when this large overseas community in Shanghai 
was organized through the Japanese Consulate into JRA. They were part of the overseas 
Japanese communities in China, and participant of the foreign society in Shanghai. They 
shared the extraterritorialities with other foreign communities inside the settlement areas. 
Their merchants, investors, and other small dealers, like merchants of other foreign 
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nationals, enjoyed the same status in the city and had run their businesses under the 
treaty ports system. The principles of the so-called informal empires maintained 
carefully by all these participant powers. However, when Japanese peaceful and 
economic diplomacy ended and the Chinese nationalist revolution succeeded in the end 
of 1920s, the environment for the Japanese community (and even other foreign 
communities) in Shanghai shifted. The war broke out in 1932 marks that such a system 
was faced with serious challenge: On the one hand, the Chinese nationalists threatened 
to withdraw the privileges settled by the treaty port system; on the other hand, the 
Japanese community seemed to be more military and aggressive in its resistance to the 
Chinese anti-foreign movements and searched for the new way to head out when they 
were unable to solve their difficulties under the treaty port system. Their answer was 
violence. 
As Mark R. Peattie pointed out, the end of the conflict left the Japanese in a 
stronger position, not only military but also politically. The growing dominance of 
Japanese military force in Hongkou part of Settlement made the concession life changed 
a lot. For Japanese community, they had dominated Hongkou district that "the Council 
exercised almost no control."^®' The Japanese military presence in Hongkou district 
became another power center of the Japanese community, which had been turned to be 
more and more combative after 1932. Hongkou district had finally been turned into a 
Japanese dominated kingdom when more Chinese were gradually dispatched out of 
their places in the 1930s. Moreover, the western powers in the city had to be faced with 
a stronger and aggressive Japanese power since 1932. For modem Shanghai, 1932 was 
also a watershed. Even though, after 1932, the original treaty port system and the 
special administrative system inside the International Settlement and the French 
Concession remained until 1943 when they were taken over by the Japanese military 
force, Japanese hostility hardly made concession life pleasant to most westerners, 
especially in the end of 1930s. The position of the foreign enclaves in Shanghai changed, 
when the characteristics of Japanese community altered in 1932. 
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Conclusion 
By the broke out of Shanghai Incident in 1932, the development of the Japanese 
community in Shanghai had come to another turning point after the signing of the 
Shimonoseki Treaty. 
Before 1932, Japanese community participated in the foreign society in Shanghai 
based on the extraterritorialities of the treaty ports system. They seemed to be 
well-established under such a system that the Japanese merchants had put large 
economic stake in the Shanghai market. Like other main western powers in the city, 
Japanese main interests in Shanghai were of economically importance rather than 
political intentions. However, without the Japanese presence in the city, Shanghai would 
not be able to establish its international importance, especially in East Asia. Moreover, 
Shanghai could not maintain its unique Chinese cosmopolitanism without their 
influence. ^^ ^ Japanese community had its own uniqueness among the foreign 
communities in Shanghai. 
First, the Japanese established an insulated and self-contained community in 
Hongkou district even without an exclusive Japanese Concession. Even though it 
became the largest foreign community in the city after the 1910s, there was not an 
exclusive Japanese Concession in the city. The community initiated and developed by 
joining the foreign enclaves in the city - the International Settlement in Shanghai, 
though Hongkou district in the International Settlement, where was nicknamed "Little 
Japan", became an area contained most of the Japanese populations and facilities. With 
the large Japanese Consulate, located on the waterfront of the conjunction of the Suzhou 
Creek and Huangpu River, and other communal facilities set up around, the Japanese 
shops, apartments, prosperous cotton mills crowded in the streets of Hongkou and 
districts around, while the Japanese wharves, warehouses strung out along the 
waterfront of Huangpu. Meanwhile the branches of large Japanese enterprises - banks, 
navigation corporations and large trading companies - loomed above the nearby Bund 
downtown. Like other citizens in the city, the Japanese community, treated in this thesis, 
seemed to have been well adjusted to live in this bifurcated world of China's largest 
treaty port. Although they had little personal contact with Westerners and Chinese in the 
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city, they were self-contained by their own enterprises, most of which located in 
Hongkou district. 
Secondly, the Japanese community in Shanghai had a closer relation with their 
government at home than any other foreign communities in the International Settlement. 
Such a large overseas community in Shanghai was organized through the Japanese 
Consulate into Japanese Residents' Association (JRA), both of which had close contact 
with Gaimusho or some other governmental or military power at their homeland. Even 
though they had representatives in the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) and admitted 
that they were part of the foreign society inside the International Settlement, they had 
enjoyed their own administrative structure created by the Japanese Consulate in the city 
and their government at home. The JRA, a self-rule entity of the Japanese community, 
with representatives from the various economic circles and neighborhood street unions, 
collected taxes from their nationals in order to maintain their communal duties and the 
management expense. However, inside the Japanese community the stratification 
seemed to be severer than other foreign communities in Shanghai, especially during the 
period of great Sino-Japanese tension. British community had similar stratification as 
the “company，’ and "native" factions inside the Japanese communi ty ,ye t , inside the 
British community, we cannot see the similar heightened class tensions inside the 
Japanese community. 
Thirdly, the national tensions seemed to be more combative and vengeful between 
Japanese community and communities of other nationals in Shanghai, especially with 
the Chinese communities. Even though they had less contact with western civilians in 
Shanghai, they were not satisfied with their positions inside the International Settlement. 
They tried to improve their situation inside the SMC by economic expansion in the city, 
while they still felt they get little protection from this authority. On the other hand, 
during the late 1920s to the early 1930s, things were changing even more broadly in 
Shanghai for the Japanese, whose position was evolving in the face of the triumph of 
Chinese nationalism. Even though some historians argued that their trading houses, 
which had concentrated on import-export trades or on servicing that trade (insurance, 
shipping) were vulnerable under the anti-Japanese boycotts, especially during the 
boycotts happened during the late 1920s through early 1930s严 the psychological 
effects of the boycotts were not insignificant in this period of time. The target of the 
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Chinese nationalists was the privileges they gained, but the Japanese felt that the 
Chinese threat was also towards their property and even their lives. Since ultimately 
they did not want to give up such privileges, based on which they established their 
community in the city, they began to rely on the Japanese military to protect them and 
their economic interests in the city. 
In Asia, Shanghai became the center of a network of cities linked together by ship 
routes for purposes of marketing, transportation, and tourism. While the imprint of 
British colonialism is clearly discernible, this chain of cities nevertheless formed an 
international political, economic and cultural space in which not only Britain and France 
but also Japan played a significant role. However, during the interwar period, when an 
"enterprising cosmopolitan urban society blossomed",Shanghai had also become the 
focal point of contact between Japanese and Chinese civilians. 
When Japanese aggression had been regarded as the new wave of imperialism by 
the Chinese, Japanese community was singled out as the target of the Chinese 
nationalist sentiment in Shanghai. Nationalism, as argued by Lucian Pye, is also 
"shaped by interactions with other nations as both friend and foe."^ ®^ Thus, Japanese 
aggression had also aroused nationalistic passions among Chinese citizens in Shanghai, 
while the Kuomintang had related such self-consciousness with the national self-esteem. 
When a high patriotic pitch was aroused after September 18 1931, the Japanese 
community in Shanghai, a community had close link to their homeland, demanded the 
help and protection from Japan. Even though most main western powers in Shanghai, 
especially the Shanghai British, had also disrespected the limits of the concessions, it 
was Japanese who, for the first time, started a war close to the center of foreign 
Shanghai, disregarding the neutralism of the foreign society. 
It is not groundless (maybe not completely true) to argue that the Japanese 
community in Shanghai was just doing everything to protect their ‘home，，simply 
because they believed that it was them who recreated their home abroad in the Hongkou 
district of Shanghai, they had to protect their own "territory" no matter by what means. 
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Glossary 
Akamon kurabu 赤門俱樂部 Haining Road 海寧路 
Akutagawa Ryunosuke 芥川龍之介 Hankou 漢口 
Bakumatsu 幕末 Hibymn 避病院 
Banzujie 半租界 Higashi Honganji Temple 東本願寺 
Baoshan district 寳山區 Hongkou 虹口，洪口 
Beichuanhong 北川洪 Hongkou gang 虹口港 
Bei Sichuan lu 北四川路 Hongkou shi 虹口市 
Biji 筆記 Huajie 華界 
Boshokuha 妨織派 Huangpu district 黃浦區 
Chenghuangmiao 城隍廟 Huangpu River 黃浦江 
Chokuyu shosha 直輸商社 Huating 華亭 
Chonaikai 町内會 IshiiAkira 石井徹 
Dai Nihon engyo Company 大日本塩 Hirobumi 伊籐博文 
業公司 ItoYonejiro 伊東米治郎 
Dai Shanhai 大上海 Iwasaki Gofuku Shop 岩崎吳服店 
Daoguang 道光 Jiangwan 江灣 
Daoshu 道署 Jiaqing 嘉慶 
D a o t a i 道台 J i k e i d a n自警圑 
Denglai 登萊 Jiujiang 舊江 
DingRichang 丁日昌 Kaid5 School 開導學校 
Dochakuha 土著派 Kaishaha 會社派 
Dongyang Chashe 東洋茶社 Kawabata Teiji 河端貞次 
Tonwakan 東和館 KishidaGink5 岸田吟香 
Fukushima 福島 KonbuKaisha 昆布會社 
Giyutai 義勇隊 KokusakuKigyS 國策企業 
Gongli Wenping 公立文憑 K郎yS Firm 廣業洋行 
Gong Mujiu 宮慕久 Kyorya mindan hS 居留民團法 
Guangdong bang 廣東 S Kyoryu min kai 居留民會 
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l i 裏 Nihon Menka 日本綿花 
Lihongkou 裏虹口 Nihon YUsen Kaisha 日本郵船會社 
Lihongqiao 裏虹橋 Nisshin Kisen 日清汽船 
Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 Oguri Sukocho 小栗棲香頂 
Liaodong Bandao 遼東半島 Peking Road 北京路 
Lin Gui 麟桂 Penghu Qundao 激湖群島 
Lushun 旅順 Pudong 浦東 
Lu Xun 魯迅 Qiujiang 叫江 
Maloo 馬路 Rakuzendo 樂善堂 
Matsumoto Honten 松本本店 R5nins 浪人 
Matsuba 松葉 Senzaimaru 千歲九 
Mitake 三竹 Seinendan 青年団 
Mitsubishi Kaisha 三菱會社 Shahong 沙洪 
Mitsui Bussan 三井物產 Shanghaixian 上海縣 
Miyazaki Toten 宮崎滔天 Shanhai Annai 上海案內 
Murai 村井 Shanhai Hojin Eigyobetsu 上海邦人 
Nagasaki ken, Shanhai shi 營業別 
長丨椅県-上海市 Shanhai Nihonjin Chonaikai Rengoka 
Nagataki Hisakichi 永灘久吉 上海日本人町內會聯合會 
Nanshi 南市 Shanhai Shodokai上海商同會 
Nihonjin Kyokai 日本人協會 Shigemitsu Mamoru 重光葵 
Nihondo Book Store 曰本堂書店 Shinagawa Tadamichi 品JI 丨忠道 
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Shichoson 市町村 Wusong Road 吳淞路 
Shinai sha 親愛舍 Wusong River 吳淞江 
Shuyuan 書院 Xiamen 廈門 
Suzhou Creek 蘇州河 Xiancheng 縣城 
Suzuki Shigetaka 鈴木重孝 Xianya 縣衙 
Tamai 田每 Xinhongkou 新虹口 
Tanizaki Jun'ichiro 穀崎潤一郎 Xinhongqiao 新虹橋 
Tashiro House 田代屋 Yamen 衙門 
Teikoku Zaigo gunjin kai 帝國在鄕軍 Yangkingpang 洋涇浜 
人會 Yangpu district 楊浦區 
Tencho Setsu 天長節 Yangshupu 楊樹浦 
Tianjin 天津 Yano Fumi 矢野文雄 
ToaDobun Shoin 東亞同文書院 Yantai 煙臺 
Tokyo Teikoku Daigaku 東京帝國大學 Yasuda 安田 
Toyo Menka 東洋綿花 Yuebang粵幫 
Toyo Shiga 東洋煙草 ZengGuofan 曾國藩 
Toyo So 東洋莊 Zhabei 鬧北 
Tsuchibashig5 土橋號 Zhongchuanhong 中川洪 
UchiyamaKanzo 內山完造 Zhonghongkou 中虹口 
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